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I. INTRODUCTION
A disturbing disjunction exists in the federal court system at the
appellate level, which, if left unaddressed, can undermine the public's
confidence in the judicial system and its integrity on many levels. The
disjunction involves the flourishing of court-financed appellate mediation
programs to assist parties in settlement on the one hand, 1 and the disregard
of the impact of these judicial programs in settlement-related vacatur case
law on the other.
I See, e.g., JUDITH MCKENNA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT
PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 26-32 tbl. 17 (2000); ROBERT J.
NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS 3-4 (1997). See also infra pp. 425-30 app. Mediation programs
have also flourished at the federal district court levels. See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER &
DONNA SIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1996).
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Settlement is a commonplace occurrence in the litigation process, 2
including at the appellate stage. 3 A settlement reached during the appeal
phase may include a request to vacate the lower court judgment.4 Vacatur is
an equitable remedy, which a court can grant if it determines appropriate.
5
One particular category of vacatur requests-those relating to vacating
judgments to assist settlements-acts as a lightning rod for many policy
questions involving the proper role of courts and settlement activities.
6
2 Most cases that are filed eventually result in settlement. Typically only a small
fraction culminate in a trial, and a small portion of these go on to become appeals. See
generally Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV.
1093 (1996); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994); Herbert M. Kritzer,
Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161 (1986).
3 See infra note 29. See also Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of
Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REv.
589 (1991); Richard A. Posner, Mediation, Text of Eleventh Annual Frank E.A. Sander
Lecture for the American Bar Association's Section of Dispute Resolution (July 8, 2000)
(transcript on file with author). Cf. MCKENNA ET AL., supra note 1, at 4 tbl.1 (Of 53,148
appeals filed in 1998, only slightly more than half-25,846 (51%)-were terminated on
the merits.); JUDICIAL BUsINEss OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2000 tbls.S-1 and B,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000 (Of 54,697 appeals filed during 12
month period ending September 30, 2000, only half-27,516 (50%-)-were terminated on
the merits.).
4 Vacatur requests to assist settlements reached in the course of appellate mediation
programs occur and, although not in large numbers, often are critical to the settlement.
Telephone interviews with circuit court mediators serving in the Second, Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits (Oct. 2, 2000-May 25, 2001) (notes on file
with author). See Henry E. Klingeman, Note, Settlement Pending Appeal: An Argument
for Vacatur, 58 FORDHAM. L. REV. 233, 235-36 (1989) (explaining that vacatur is
frequently viewed as an important tool for encouraging parties to settle pending appeal).
See also Stephen R. Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear: Depublication & Stipulated
Reversal in the California Supreme Court, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1033, 1070 n.205
(1993) (offering one empirical study that estimated that in about one percent of the cases
settling while an appeal was pending in the California intermediate appellate courts,
parties sought to have an appellate court do something other than dismiss); Fisch, supra
note 3, at 590 ("The Nestle court [Second Circuit] and most commentators view vacatur
after settlement as a useful tool in encouraging settlements and reducing appellate
caseloads.").
5 See infra Part I.A.
6 See generally Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an
Adversary System, 44 HASTINGs L.J. 1 (1992); Fisch, supra note 3; Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Galanter & Cahill, supra note 2; Samuel
R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil-Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1996); David Luban, Settlements & the Erosion of the
Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995); Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement:
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Critics of vacating judgments to assist settlements contend that such a
practice undermines the integrity of the judicial process by converting
judgments into bargaining chips. Defenders contend that settlement-related
vacatur is appropriate if it enables parties to reach a consensual resolution,
rather than a court-imposed one. They contend without vacatur, parties may
be forced to litigate an issue that they can settle.
7
Both sides of the debate claim efficiency for their side. The critics claim
that the loss of precedent caused by vacatur translates into an inefficient use
of court resources. The defenders claim that denial of vacatur to assist
settlements results in the inefficient use of judicial resources because both
parties and courts needlessly devote time to a claim that can be settled. 8
In this Article, I introduce another thread to the settlement-related
vacatur debate-the disjunction between vacatur case law and the growing
institutionalization of appellate court mediation programs. When parties
request vacatur of a lower court judgment to assist settlement, the prevailing
trend is to deny the request. 9 In a pivotal case, U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v.
Bonner Mall Partnership,10 the U.S. Supreme Court pronounced that to
allow a settling party who "steps off the statutory [appeal] path" to use
vacatur to erase a judgment would compromise the significance of judicial
precedent and "disturb the orderly operation of the federal judicial
system."1' Absent "exceptional circumstances," a party surrenders any claim
to the equitable remedy of vacatur when it voluntarily abandons its right to
appeal. 12 Since Bonner Mall, both circuit and district courts have applied a
vacatur standard that is focused on party conduct. However, completely
The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833
(1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995); Judith
Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) [hereinafter Resnick,
Managerial Judges]; Judith Resnick, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments,
Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth
Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471 (1994) [hereinafter Resnick, Whose Judgment?]; Kent
D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113 (1990); Michael W. Loudenslager,
Note, Erasing the Law: The Implications of Settlements Conditioned upon Vacatur or
Reversal of Judgments, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1229 (1993); David A. Rammelt, Note,
"Inherent Power" and Rule 16: How Far Can a Federal Court Push the Litigant Toward
Settlement? 65 IND. L.J. 965 (1990).
7 See infra Part III.A.
8 See infra Part III.A.
9 See infra Parts III.B.-III.D.
10 U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
11Id. at 27.
12 Id. at 27, 29.
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missing from the current application of the standard is consideration of the
courts' active roles in detouring parties off the traditional appellate path to
explore settlement through court-financed mediation programs, 13 which
often mandate participation.
14
Using the federal courts as a framework, 15 in this Article I will argue
that the parties' participation in appellate court mediation programs should
be factored into a court's analysis when determining whether to vacate a
judgment to assist settlement. Otherwise, an ironic situation arises where the
courts are financing and ordering parties into appellate mediation programs
on the one hand and on the other automatically punishing the parties if a
settlement results by denying any resulting vacatur request on the basis that
they freely abandoned their appeal and removed themselves from the
traditional appellate "path." I suggest that such an inconsistent position
undermines the orderly operation of the judicial system and its integrity, a
fundamental concern underlying the Bonner Mall decision. The disjunction,
I contend, between vacatur case law and the growth of appellate mediation
programs will do more harm to judicial integrity than a thousand vacaturs
ever would.
My endeavor is separated into four parts. Part II describes the conditions
that gave rise to federal appellate mediation programs and provides an
overview of their growth and success. I discuss the court financing and
staffing of these programs, case selection methods, mandatory features and
the focus on promoting and expediting settlement.
In Part III, I summarize the issues and concerns underlying the debate
over the propriety of post-judgment vacatur to assist settlement. I then
examine relevant vacatur case law at the U.S. Supreme Court, circuit and
district court levels, and discuss the absence of any consideration of
appellate mediation programs in these decisions.
In Part IV, I examine the implications of the disjunction between vacatur
case law and the continuing growth of appellate mediation programs. I
contend that the rigid application of the Bonner Mall standard creates two
serious jurisprudential and practical anomalies: it requires a strained judicial
application of the case law, and it limits the effectiveness of appellate
mediation programs. I suggest that the consequences of the disjunction
13 See infra Parts III.B.-III.D.
14 See infra Part II.B.
15 State courts in about half the states have appellate ADR programs, generally
mediation or mediation-like settlement conferences. See Robert J. Niemic, On Appeal-
Mediation Becoming More Appealing in Federal and State Courts, Disp. RESOL. MAG.,
Summer 1999, at 13. Although this Article does not explicitly address state court
programs, many of the observations and proposals may be instructive.
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between the case law and appellate mediation programs include the specter
of serious diminishment of public confidence in the orderly operation of the
judicial system.
In Part V, I raise proposals for reform and focus on a proposal in which
courts would include participation in appellate mediation programs as one of
several factors to consider when deciding a post-judgment vacatur request to
assist settlement. I argue that a more elastic application of the Bonner Mall
standard is appropriate and discuss two appellate court decisions that
provide a sound template for such an approach. Moreover, after addressing
potential abuses of such an approach, I conclude that compelling
jurisprudential and public policy grounds support factoring parties'
participation in appellate mediation programs into the analysis.
II. OVERVIEW OF APPELLATE MEDIATION PROGRAMS IN FEDERAL
CIRCUIT COURTS
A. The Rise of Federal Appellate Mediation Programs
An explosive growth in appellate litigation in the federal courts of
appeals has been occurring over the past few decades.16 From 1977 to 1993
the growth of appellate dockets was so dramatic that the number of appeals
nearly tripled. 17 Moreover, during roughly the same period, the number of
appellate filings grew at a rate almost four times greater than the rate of
growth in active circuit judgeships.' 8 Since 1996, filings of appeals have
continued to climb.19 By necessity, the federal appellate courts have had to
implement efficient case management techniques, which have included the
establishment of appellate mediation programs.20
16 See Jerrold J. Ganzfried, Bringing Business Judgment to Business Litigation:
Mediation and Settlement in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 531,
533 (1997).
17 See CAROLE KRAFKA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STALKING THE INCREASE IN THE
RATE OF FEDERAL CIVIL APPEALS 7 (1995).
18 See JUDITH A. MCKENNA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 17-19 (1993).
19 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2000, at 13-14, available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/front/2000artext.pdf (showing that since 1996,
filings of appeals have climbed five percent).
20 Other case management techniques include the use of summary or unpublished
opinions. See infra note 159.
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Appellate mediation programs--often called conferences-find their
basis in Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 33 grants
appellate courts authority to direct parties into settlement discussions:
The court may direct the attorneys-and when appropriate the parties-
to participate in one or more conferences to address any matter that may aid
in disposing of the proceedings, including simplifying the issues and
discussing settlement. A judge or other person designated by the court may
preside over the conference. Before a settlement conference, attorneys must
consult with their clients and obtain as much authority as feasible to settle
the case. The court may, as a result of a conference, enter an order
controlling the course of the proceedings or implementing any settlement
agreement.21
Inspired by district court mediation programs, in 1974, the Second
Circuit implemented a pioneer Civil Appeals Management Plan (CAMP).22
The goal of CAMP was to assist litigants resolve their appeals on a
consensual basis and without the need for a final decision by the court.23 A
CAMP conference was scheduled in nearly all civil cases docketed in the
court. At the conference, a court-employed staff counsel served as an
impartial mediator to explore settlement, educate the parties on the law and
practice in the Second Circuit, and resolve procedural problems informally
and expeditiously.24 Throughout the span of its existence, the Second Circuit
CAMP has reported very impressive settlement results and significant
savings in judicial resources. 25
Since the inauguration of CAMP in the Second Circuit, all twelve of the
U.S. courts of appeal have established mediation programs under Rule 33
and local circuit rules, 26 with the exception of the Federal Circuit.27 The
21 FED. R. App. P. 33.
22 Irving R. Kaufman, New Remedies for the Next Century of Judicial Reform: Time
as the Greatest Innovator, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 261 (1988).
23 Id. at 261-62.
24 NIEMIC, supra note 1, at 26-27.
25 Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution
in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAm L. REV. 1, 11 (1990) [hereinafter Kaufman, Reform
for a System] ("CAMP settles more cases than two judges would normally handle in a
year at one-third the costs of two judicial chambers."); Irving R. Kaufman, Must Every
Appeal Run the Gamut?-The Civil Appeals Management Program, 95 YALE L.J. 755,
758-61 (1986) [hereinafter Kaufman, Must Every Appeal] (indicating data showed that
CAMP "reduce[d] by one-sixth the number of cases argued").
26 See NIEMIC, supra note 1, at 2-3; infra pp. 425-30 app.;. see also Niemic, supra
note 15.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
cumulative results have been an improvement in overall case management28
and an increase in settlements. 29 These programs have enabled the courts to
accommodate increased filings without the need and expense of additional
judges. 30 Moreover, these programs can result in an increase in savings and
27 The Federal Circuit Court's settlement discussion rule, FED. CIR. R. 33, requires
parties, through counsel, to discuss settlement within seven days after filing of the
principal briefs. Moreover, the Federal Circuit Court's process differs from other federal
appellate conference programs in that court staff is not involved in scheduling or
conducting conferences. See infra pp. 425-30 app.
2 8 See JAMES B. EAGLIN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE PRE-ARGUMENT PROGRAM IN THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: AN EVALUATION 8 (1990) (reporting that a 1985-
1986 study confirmed that the Sixth Circuit conference program was meeting one of its
stated objectives of lessening case management burdens by clarifying procedural
matters); NIEMIC, supra note 1, at 3-4; U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, APPELLATE MEDIATION PROGRAM 2 (1998) ("Issues and positions
are clarified in the mediation process so that, even if settlement is not achieved, the Court
benefits from more efficient briefing."), available at
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/refdesklhandbook/camediat.pdf.
29 See, e.g., McKENNA ET AL., supra note 1, at 84 ("The [Third Circuit] reports that
the [appellate mediation] program settles or disposes of approximately 90-100 cases per
year."); THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, MEDIATION AND
GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE MEDIATION REPRESENTATION 17 ("Each year hundreds of
appeals are resolved through the mediation program."); Ganzfried, supra note 16, at 539
(finding that the D.C. Circuit mediation program since 1989 has had a 31% settlement
rate and in 1996 reported a 35% settlement rate); Seventh Circuit Launches Mediation
Program, 5 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 252, 252 (Nov. 1994) (stating that the Sixth
Circuit program reported a 44% resolution rate requiring no judicial intervention as
opposed to the normal attrition rate of 20%); Honorable Dorothy Nelson, Address at the
CPR Winter Meeting Presentation (Jan. 25, 2001) (stating that in 2000, the Ninth Circuit
had over 1,000 cases submitted with an 80% settlement rate); Sixth Circuit Mediator
Robert Rack, Achieving Quality in Service in Federal Court-Sponsored ADR Programs:
Critical Values & Concerns, Address at ABA Dispute Resolution Annual Meeting
(2001) (noting that of the 200 to 250 cases mediated by the four staff mediators, there
was a 45% settlement rate, which is equivalent to the work of 1.5 appellate judges). See
also CAL. TASK FORCE ON APPELLATE MEDIATION, MANDATORY MEDIATION IN THE FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS iii-iv
(2001) (reporting a 43% settlement rate in a two-year pilot program and recommending
an extension of program because achieved goals of "reducing costs, time to resolution,
and the adversary nature of litigation, while increasing dispositions without judicial
intervention and litigation satisfaction with the judicial process"), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/mediation.pdf.
30 The Seventh Circuit's mediation program saves roughly one year's worth of a
judge's time and enables the court to avoid having to ask Congress to authorize an
additional judgeship. See EAGLIN, supra note 28, at 6 (reporting a 1985-1986 study
conducted confirmed that a Sixth Circuit conference program was meeting one of its
stated objective of saving judges time by facilitating settlement and early termination of
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party satisfaction by providing an opportunity to reach a consensual
resolution early in the appeal process.
31
In light of these favorable and impressive results, it is not surprising that
the Judicial Conference has consistently supported these appellate
programs.32 One circuit mediator has opined that "[t]o the best of [my]
knowledge, this support has been based on the appellate judges' recognition
of the efficacy of these programs and their value to the courts in terms of
docket relief, case management assistance, and good service to litigants. '33
cases without judicial, involvement; data indicated the program was conducting the work
of 1.06 appellate judges); MCKENNA ET AL., supra note 1, at 84 ("'he'[Third Circuit's]
appellate mediation program was designed to conserve judicial -and party resources by
facilitating settlement .... "); id. at 98 ('The [Fourth Circuit's] Office of the Circuit
Mediator provides settlement assistance to reduce the caseload of the judges of the
circuit, save taxpayer money, and save the time and money of litigants and their
counsel."); U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, supra
note 28, at I ("Mediation was originally intended to supplement the Court's 1986 Case
Management Plan, which was undertaken to accommodate a sixty percent increase in
filings and pending cases over a two-year period. The Appellate Mediation Program has a
significant impact on the Court's workload. Cases that are settled do not proceed to oral
argument, thus saving the time ofjudges and law clerks who would otherwise prepare for
argument."); Posner, supra note 3.
31 See EAGLIN, supra note 28, at 9 (reporting that over 50% of responding attorneys
surveyed in a 1985-1986 Sixth Circuit conference program study "expressed the view
that the program resulted in net savings in time spent on the appeal"); U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, supra note 28, at 1 ("[Mediation] was
also intended to help parties by curtailing the expense involved in protracted appeals and
to encourage the development of creative resolution options .... "). See aso CAL. TASK
FORCE ON APPELLATE MEDIATION, supra note 29, at 12 (finding that two-year pilot
program achieved substantial savings for the parties and court-in appeals that settled
through mediation, counsel estimated the cumulative savings for the parties in excess of
$7.1 million).
32 "First by granting them separate budget authority, and second by exempting them
from the 84% staffing limits imposed on all other Judiciary staff operations." Letter from
Robert W. Rack, Jr., Chief Circuit Mediator, Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, to Hon.
Walter H. Rice, Chief Judge, United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio (Jan.
14, 1999) (on file with author).
33 Id.
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B. Features of Appellate Mediation Programs
1. Overview
Mediation provides a process and setting in which parties can explore
settlement possibilities and voluntarily agree upon a consensual resolution.
34
In comparison with trial court litigation, appellate litigation does not offer as
many opportunities or motives for exploring settlement.35 Appellate
mediation programs are structured to change these settlement dynamics.
Appellate mediations are designed to assist parties, with the aid of a
mediator, explore the consequences of not settling and to generate settlement
possibilities. 36 Factors typically considered in determining whether to pursue
a settlement at the appellate stage include the probabilities of winning or
losing on appeal, the possibility of alternatives better suited to resolve the
parties' interests, and the costs and time disruptions involved to perfect an
appeal.37 One circuit mediator has described the process as follows:
Every effort is made to generate offers, counteroffers, and alternative
settlement options until the parties either settle or know the case cannot be
settled. Where it is possible, the mediator will assist the parties in resolving
related trial court cases, frequently in an attempt to achieve a 'global
settlement' of various lawsuits.
38
Without appellate mediation programs, many settlement discussions and
settlements may never occur between the parties at this stage.
39
34 See infra Part II.C. See also Stephen 0. Kinnard, Mediating the Decided Case-
What To Expect if You're Looking To Settle at the Appellate Level, DisP. RESOL. MAG.,
Summer 1999, at 16.
35 For example, during the pre-trial phase of litigation, counsel are frequently in
contact with one another concerning depositions, document productions, and motion
practice. Natural opportunities arise for counsel to mention settlement proposals. Even if
counsel is reluctant to raise the subject, it is common practice for district judges and
magistrate judges to raise settlement at a pretrial conference. Ganzfried, supra note 16, at
537.
36 Mori Irvine, Better Late than Never: Settlement at the Federal Court of Appeals,
I J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 341 (1999).
37 Id. at 346.
38 Id. at 350.
39 See CAL. TASK FORCE ON APPELLATE MEDIATION, supra note 29, at 11 ("Many
attorneys don't take the initiative for settlement negotiations at the appellate level. By
instituting mediation, the Court of Appeal both removes the onus of taking the first step
and afford a forum for settlement discussions."), available at
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Incentives for settlement often decrease as appellate briefing and oral
argument preparation progresses. 40 To address this dynamic, appellate
mediations typically are scheduled to occur before the filing of the appellate
briefs. 41 The mediation conference is generally conducted in a series of joint
and separate sessions with the mediator. Mediators work with counsel to
select a location that is convenient for all participants. Where the circuit
boundaries encompass large states-for example, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits-a large percentage of conferences take place over the
telephone. 42 Teleconferences are noted for their convenience, efficiency, and
cost-effectiveness. 43 In the more geographically compact circuits-for
example, the First, Second, Third, and the District of Columbia-most
conferences are held in person.
Confidentiality is a critical component of any mediation program.44 All
of the sessions are confidential. The mediator does not make a report to the
court, and the parties are prohibited from making any reference to the
mediation in motions, briefs, or argument.45
www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/mediation.pdf; EAGLIN, supra note 28, at
9 (reporting nearly 80% of responding attorneys surveyed in a 1985-1986 Sixth Circuit
conference program study indicated that they "would not have taken the initiative to
approach the opposing side about settlement").
4 0 See Niemic, supra note 15, at 14.
41 See id. at 13.
42 See id. at 14. A Tenth Circuit Mediator estimated that more than 95% of his
mediations are conducted using teleconferences. Tenth Circuit Mediator David Aemmer,
Mediation on Appeal: What It Is and Why It Works, Address at the ABA Dispute
Resolution Annual Meeting (2001). See also 4TH CR. L.R. 33 ("Mediation conferences
will generally be conducted by telephone .... "); 10TH CIR. L.R. 33-1(B) ("Conferences
are conducted by telephone unless the circuit mediation office directs otherwise."); U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, THE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM
(2001) ("When all participants reside in the Chicago metropolitan area, Rule 33
conferences are usually held in the Settlement Conference Office at the United States
Courthouse. Otherwise, conferences are generally conducted by telephone."), available at
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/confaty/Scoprgm.htm.
43 Niemic, supra note 15.
44 See generally UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2001); UNIF. MEDIATION ACT reporter's
notes (2001).
4 5 See, e.g., U.S. Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit General Order Governing the
Appellate Conference Program 2 (Mar. 27, 2000) (providing confidentiality protections),
available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/clerk/clerk home.cfm; ST CIR. L.R. 33; 3D
CiR. L.R. 33.5(c); 4TH CIR. L.R. 33; 6TH CiR. L.R. 33(c)(4); 8TH CIR. L.R. 33A(c); 9TH
CiR. L.R. 33-1;. 10TH CIR L.R. 33.1(D); 11TH CIR. R. 33-1(e); D.C. CIR. R. APP. P. app.
III (providing communications are 'privileged); U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT, supra note 42 (providing Rule 33 conferences are confidential),
389
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Pre-meeting submission of papers setting forth the parties' positions and
interests generally are not required.46 Mediators may begin conferences by
asking parties to discuss all the issues in the case, not just those being
appealed. The purpose of these broad-based discussions is to explore all of
the issues and to evaluate the risks for both sides. Private, or caucus, sessions
are often more candid than the joint session, and typically the information
revealed in these private sessions is not shared with the other side, unless the
participants permit the mediator to transmit it.
47
In most cases, there is extensive follow-up activity to the initial session,
including additional telephone calls, in-person conferences, and private
conferences with the individual parties. 48 As a result, appellate mediation
discussions may continue for days, weeks, or longer.49 Generally, the
mediation does not significantly alter the briefing schedule, if at all.
However, each circuit's particular procedure needs to be consulted on this
matter.5
0
2. Court-Financed and Staffed
Each circuit finances its appellate mediation program. 51 The programs
generally are available to the parties at no charge.52 In the majority of
available at http://www.ca7uscourts.gov/conf aty. See also Mori Irvine, A Look at
Mediation, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 27, 2001, at B10.
46 The D.C. and Third Circuits require such submissions, the Eleventh Circuit
encourages them and the other circuits do not explicitly address them. Panel Observation,
Mediation on Appeal: What It Is and Why It Works, Address at the ABA Dispute
Resolution Annual Meeting (2001).
47 Irvine, supra note 36, at 349.
48 Id. at 350.
49 Mori Irvine, The Lady or the Tiger: Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 27
U. TOL. L. REV. 795, 799 (1996).
50 See 3D CIR. L.R. 33.3 ("If a case is referred to mediation, a briefing schedule shall
be deferred during the pendency of mediation unless the court or special master
determines otherwise."); 9TH CIR. L.R. 33-1 circuit advisory committee n. (providing
briefing schedule remains in effect unless adjusted by a court mediator to facilitate
settlement); D.C. CIR. R. APP. P. app. III (providing cases in mediation remain subject to
normal scheduling for briefing and oral argument); U.S. Court of Appeals for Fifth
Circuit General Order Governing the Appellate Conference Program (Mar. 27,
2000) (providing time for filing of briefs not tolled automatically); U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, supra note 42 (stating briefing is only postponed
until after the initial conference, absent an order), available at
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/conf aty/Scoprgm.htm; Irvine, supra note 45 (stating that
the case proceeds on schedule).
51 Niemic, supra note 15, at 15.
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programs, staff attorneys with prior mediation experience or training are
employed by the court to conduct the mediations. 53 In some courts, senior
federal judges serve as mediators, 54 and in at least one court program, the
services of pro bono lawyers trained as appellate mediators are used.55
3. Case Selection Methods
How a particular case on appeal is scheduled for mediation can vary
from program to program. However, the selection process can be divided
basically into two stages-eligibility and assignment.
a) Eligibility
Although many similarities exist between the rules, each circuit has its
own rules regarding which cases are eligible for its mediation program. All
of the programs require that parties must be represented by counsel to be
eligible for selection. The programs also exclude appeals involving criminal
issues (for example, motions to vacate sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2255)
and prisoner cases (for example, habeas corpus petitions). From the pool of
fully counseled, civil cases, the majority of programs also exclude original
petitions and appeals involving unresolved jurisdictional issues. Some
programs also exclude immigration, Social Security issues, and tax cases.56
52 1d. ("In at least one court, the costs for teleconferences are typically borne by the
party initiating the call.").
53 See MCKENNA ET AL., supra note 1. By its terms, Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 33 allows courts to delegate their authority to conduct settlement conferences
to "other person[s] designated by the court for that purpose." See also FED. R. App. P. 33
Advisory Committee Note on the 1994 Amendment ("The rule allows a judge or other
person designated by the court to preside over a conference. A number of local rules
permit persons other than judges to preside over conferences."). The mediation programs
and their attorney-mediators "are delegates of the court and the judges thereof, [and] any
orders or other communications issued by the [mediation program office] should be
treated as if they had been issued by the court itself." Pueblo of San Ildefonso v. Ridlon,
90 F.3d 423,425 (10th Cir. 1996).
54 See MCKENNA ETAL., supra note 1, at 26-32 tbl.17; Niemic, supra note 15, at 15.
55 See MCKENNA ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-32 tbl.17; Ganzfried, supra note 16.
Under a pilot program initiated by the Second Circuit in July 2000, instead of
participating in the CAMP program, parties can agree to participate in a mediation
conducted by a mediator selected by the parties from a court roster. See Justin Kelly,
Second Circuit Appeals Court Launches New Mediation Pilot Program (July 5, 2000), at
http://www.adrworld.com/open document.asp?Doc=xpSmGvfJg68code=WzlUqOcy.
56 See MCKENNA Er AL., supra note 1, at 26-32 tbl.17.
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b) Assignment
The programs are similar regarding how eligible cases are selected for
participation. After eligible cases have been referred to the program by the
clerk's office, the vast majority of circuit programs conduct some form of
substantive screening before scheduling a mediation. Some of the programs
conduct more extensive reviews than others. 57 After such a review, the
programs generally schedule mediations in as many cases as court resources
permit.5
8
In addition to cases being scheduled for mediation based on a review by
staff counsel, mediations also are scheduled when counsel makes such a
request, or the hearing panel makes a referral. 59
4. Mandatory Participation Features
Once a case is scheduled for mediation, participation generally is
mandatory in all the programs, with the exception of the Eighth Circuit.
60
Removal of a case upon request for a compelling reason is feasible, although
57 See infra pp. 425-30 app.
58 See id. In the Eleventh Circuit, the Circuit Mediation Office reviews all eligible
cases and selects a cross-section for mediation.
59 See infra pp. 425-30 app.
60 See MCKENNA ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-32 tbl. 17. The Eighth Circuit requires
all parties to consent to participate. See id. Whether a program is mandatory or voluntary
has an impact on some of the potential benefits. In the court-related context, some
empirical information suggests that while mandatory non-binding civil ADR programs
result in higher rates of participation and thereby provide a greater opportunity for
litigants to learn the value of ADR through participation, they also result in lower
resolution and satisfaction rates than voluntary programs. See TASK FORCE ON THE
QUALITY OF JUSTICE SUBCOMM. ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CAL., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CIVIL CASES vi (1999). At an
August 2000 Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, 79.2% of the judges and lawyers
attending an ADR program responded that it is
appropriate for a judge to order the parties to participate in a non-binding ADR
process (other than a settlement conference) over a party's objection; and 90.4%
responded that they had seen cases where an ADR process helped to produce a
settlement even though one or more of the parties initially resisted or was reluctant
to use ADR.
Hon. Dorothy W. Nelson, ADR in the New Era, CPR INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: THOUGHT PIECES ON LAWYERING, PROBLEM SOLVING AND
ADR, 65, 66-67 (2001). Moreover, "[w]hen asked whether judges should raise the issue
of ADR the initial case management conference if no party raised the issue, 96.3% said
yes." Id. at 66.
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not encouraged. 61 Failure to appear at a scheduled mediation conference can
result in sanctions.
62
Among the rationale for mandatory participation is that absent a court
mandate to participate, counsel tend not to discuss settlement at the appellate
level.63 If the programs were voluntary, it is contended, substantially fewer
cases would be settled or otherwise benefit from mediation. Moreover, in
some instances counsel may feel that mediation is appropriate, however,
their clients are reluctant to participate. The court's authority to mandate
mediation places the responsibility for initiating the process on the court.
64
In most court programs, attendance of counsel is required. For the
majority of programs, a client's attendance is not required unless the
mediator specifically requires it.6 5 However, several programs do require
clients with full settlement authority to attend or be available by telephone.
66
61 See NIEMIC, supra note 1, at 9; Irvine, supra note 36 (stating that, in the Eleventh
Circuit Mediation Program, "[i]f there is a compelling reason that mediation would not
be appropriate, the lawyer is free to call the circuit mediator and explore those
concerns."). See MCKENNA, supra note 1, at 26-32 tbl.17.
62 See 6TH CIR. L.R. 33(e) ("Upon failure of a party or attorney to comply with the
provisions of this rule or a pre-argument conference order, this Court may assess
reasonable expenses caused by the failure, including attorney's fees; assess all or a
portion of the appellate costs; or dismiss the appeal."); 10th CIR. L.R. 33.1(H) ('The
court may impose sanctions if counsel or a party violates this rule or an order entered
under it."); 11 th CIR. L.R. 33-1(f) ("Upon failure of a party or attorney to comply with
the provisions of this rule.... the court may assess reasonable expenses caused by the
failure, including attomey's fees; assess all or a portion of the appellate costs; dismiss the
appeal; or take such other appropriate action as the circumstances may warrant."); San
Iidefonso v. Ridlon, 90 F.3d 423, 425 (10th Cir. 1996) (imposing sanctions on counsel
for failure to participate in court-ordered mediation as authorized by local rule); United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit [Revised] Order Establishing
Appellate Mediation Program, effective April 14, 1998 ("Failure of counsel to attend
sessions may result in the imposition of sanctions.").
63 See supra Part II.B.1.
64 CAL. TASK FORCE ON APPELLATE MEDIATION, supra note 29, available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/mediation.pdf.
65 MCKENNA, supra note 1, at 26-32 tbl.17.
6 6 See infra pp. 425-30 app. (outlining procedures of the Third Circuit Appellate
Mediation Program, Seventh Circuit Settlement Conference Program, Eighth Circuit
Settlement Program).
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C. Settlement Focus
Appellate mediation programs exist primarily to promote and expedite
settlements of pending appeals and any related cases. 67 The savings that
67 See, e.g., 9TH CIR. L.R. 33-1 ("The primary purpose of a pre-hearing conference
shall be to explore settlement of the dispute that gave rise to the appeal."); 10TH CIR.
L.R. 33.1(A) ("The primary purpose of a conference is to explore settlement .... "); U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit General Order Governing the Appellate
Conference Program (Mar. 27, 2000) ("The principal purpose of the conference program
is to explore the possibility of settlement and to facilitate settlement discussions."); U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, supra note 28, at 1 ('The
Appellate Mediation Program uses mediation to achieve settlement of cases."); Irvine,
supra note 45, at B 10 ("[E]very circuit court of appeals except the Federal Circuit has
formally established a settlement program to help parties resolve their cases while
pending appeal."); Kaufman, Must Every Appeal, supra note 25, at 758-61 (noting the
encouragement of settlement is an important aspect of the program); Niemic, supra note
15, at 13; MCKENNA ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-32 tbl.17 (reporting all of the regional
courts of appeals have some form of appellate mediation or conference program to
resolve some appeals by settlement with little or no judicial intervention); id. at 42-
43 (describing the D.C. appellate mediation program, "The role of the mediators is to
help parties reach a settlement or, at a minimum, to help parties resolve some issues in
their case"); id. at 58 (describing the First Circuit, "The court's [Civil Appeals
Management] Program... attempts to settle cases before briefing without court action,
by encouraging and facilitating settlement of meritorious appeals and the withdrawal of
meritless appeals."); id. at 70 (describing the Second Circuit's Civil Appeals
Management Program, "The focus of the program is on settling cases .... "); id. at
84 (describing the Third Circuit, "The court's appellate mediation program was designed
to conserve judicial and party resources by facilitating settlement .... ); id. at 98 (noting
the Fourth Circuit's Office of the Circuit Mediator "provides settlement assistance to
reduce the caseload of the judges of the circuit, save taxpayer money, and save the time
and money of litigants and their counsel"); id. at 110 (noting the Fifth Circuit's Appellate
Conference Program, "The [conference] attorneys conduct settlement conferences in civil
cases selected by them .... ); id. at 123 (stating that the Sixth Circuit's Office of the
Circuit Mediator "schedules pre-argument conferences to facilitate settlement"); id. at
134 (noting of the Seventh Circuit's Settlement Conference Program, "The court has a
settlement conference program to encourage and facilitate the settlement of civil
appeals."); id. at 150 (stating that the Eighth Circuit's Settlement Program "[is] designed
to help the parties achieve a consensual resolution and to limit or clarify issues on
appeal."); id. at 164 (stating that in the Ninth Circuit's Mediation Program, "[t]he court
attempts to settle civil cases by referring them to the circuit mediation program."); id. at
179 (stating the Tenth Circuit's Mediation Office "explores settlement
possibilities .. "); id. at 192 (stating the Eleventh Circuit's Mediation Office "helps to
explore possibilities for voluntary settlement .. "); Posted Job Description for Circuit
Mediators in Eleventh Circuit (Mar. 6, 2001) (on file with author) ("The [Circuit
Mediators] will preside at mediations in civil appeals. The primary purpose of the
mediation is to settle appeals and any related cases."); Posted Job Description for Circuit
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result for both the courts and the parties by settling an appeal provide a
compelling efficiency rationale for the continued existence and growth of the
programs. 68 Attorneys attending an appellate settlement conference must
obtain from their clients "as much authority as feasible to settle the case"
pursuant to Rule 33.69 Individual rules for court conference programs
reinforce this requirement.
70
Mediators in Tenth Circuit (Apr. 24, 2001) (on file with author) ("The [Circuit
Mediators] will preside at mediation conferences in civil appeals. The primary purpose of
the conference is to settle appeals and any related cases."). The Intemet address for the
Seventh Circuit's Settlement Conference Program under Rule 33 is
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/confaty (last visited Jan. 18, 2002). These appellate
programs also address procedural and case management issues, assist parties clarify
issues, and resolve procedural matters without the necessity of motion practice. See
McKENNA ETAL., supra note 1, at 26-32 tbl.17.
68 See supra Part II.A.
69 FED. R. APp. P. 33.
70 See NIEMIC, supra note 1, at 21 (stating of the First Circuit, "[g]enerally, the
attorneys in charge of the appeals are required to attend the conference and must have
appropriate settlement authority to settle or otherwise dispose of the appeal."); id. at 27-
28 (stating of the Second Circuit, "[a]ttomeys are to participate in good faith, with a view
to resolving differences and are to obtain advance authority from their clients to make
such commitments as reasonably may be anticipated."); id. at 35 (stating that Third
Circuit Local Rule 33.5(b) requires that "[m]ediation sessions must be attended by the
senior lawyer responsible for each side of the appeal or another person with actual
authority to negotiate a settlement of the case"); id. at 43 (noting of the Fourth Circuit,
"Counsel are expected to attend with authority to initiate and respond to settlement
proposals, but conference attorneys do not necessarily expect counsel to have absolute
settlement authority"); id. at 55 (noting of the Sixth Circuit, "Counsel are expected to
come with authority to make and respond to settlement proposals"); id. at 60 (noting of
the Seventh Circuit, "[w]hether to settle is the parties' decision, but good faith
participation in the settlement process is required."); id. at 68 (stating of the Eighth
Circuit, "[i]n most situations the client, or client representative with discretionary
settlement authority, is present for in-person conferences and for joint teleconferences.");
id.at 76 (stating relative to the Ninth Circuit, "For in-person mediations, parties must
have present at the mediation an individual who is fully informed and vested with full
settlement authority. For teleconferenced mediation, if the person representing a party
does not have authority to make and respond to settlement proposals, someone with
authority must be readily available"); id. at 84 (noting of the Tenth Circuit,"[b]efore the
conference, lead counsel must obtain the broadest feasible authority to settle the
appeal."); id. at 90 (The Eleventh Circuit "requires lead counsel to obtain advance
authority from their clients to make such commitments at the conference as reasonably
may be anticipated."); id. at 97-98 (noting that the D.C. Circuit requires attendance at
mediation sessions by each party's counsel or another person with actual authority to
enter into a settlement agreement during the session).
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Moreover, a few programs explicitly require good faith participation in
their local rules.71 However, the exact boundaries of good faith are unclear
72
and largely untested in appellate programs.
73
71 See NIEMIC, supra note 1, at 27-28 (Second Circuit "attorneys are to participate
in good faith, with a view to resolving differences, and are to obtain advance authority
from their clients to make such commitments as reasonably may be anticipated."); id. at
60 (noting relative to the Seventh Circuit that "whether to settle is the parties' decision,
but good faith participation in the settlement process is required"). See also U.S. v.
Sweeney, 52 F. Supp. 2d 164, 166 (D. Mass. 1999) (involving parties who were ordered
to attend mediation by First Circuit; the mediator issued an order that provided that
parties "participate in mediation in good faith").
72 See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended
or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 575 (1997); Edward F. Sherman,
Confidentiality in ADR Proceedings: Policy Issues Arising from the Texas Experience,
38 S. TEx. L. REV. 541, 552-53 (1997); David S. Winston, Participation Standards in
Mandatory Mediation Statutes: "You Can Lead a Horse to Water. . . ," 11 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 187, 189 (1996); Richard D. English, Annotation, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Sanctions for Failure To Participate in Good Faith in, or Comply with
Agreement Made in Mediation, 43 A.L.R. 5th 545, 566-67 (2001).
73 Inconsistent case law involving sanctions relating to the good faith participation
of parties in a court-ordered mediation has been evolving at the lower court levels. See,
e.g., Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1057 (E.D. Mo. 2000), aff'd,
270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001) (imposing sanctions based on defendant's failure to
submit the required mediation memorandum and failure to send a corporate
representative with settlement authority after agreeing to participate in mediation); Raad
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (D. Neb. 1998) (awarding sanctions
awarded for defendant's refusal to participate in mediation); Foxgate Homeowners'
Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal. Inc., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (imposing
sanctions arising out of failure to participate in mediation process in good faith sent back
for reassessment based on mediator's report), rev'd, 25 P.3d 1117, 1119 (Cal.
2001) (finding no exceptions to confidentiality of communications by mediator to justify
sanctions award, a mediator may not report to the court about the conduct of participants
in a mediation); In re Acceptance Ins. Co., Relator, 33 S.W.3d 443, 454 (Tex. App.
2000) (voiding mediation orders directing parties to make a good faith effort to settle);
Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Tex. App. 1992) (vacating portions of court
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IH. DISJUNCTION BETWEEN VACATUR CASE LAW AND APPELLATE
MEDIATION PROGRAMS
A. The Vacatur Debate
1. Background
During the appellate phase, a significant number of cases settle.
74
Whether the judgment being appealed remains intact is one of the
complexities of settling during this stage. In some instances, the losing party
is concerned about the collateral consequences of the adverse judgment or
decision. For example, a decision may contain certain findings of fact that
impute a party's reputation.75 Or, the losing party may be concerned about
the use of an adverse judgment in future litigation under the doctrines of res
judicata or collateral estoppel. In a settlement context, collateral estoppel
poses the greater concerns for settling parties because of the involvement of
non-parties.
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel-also known as issue
preclusion-non-parties may be able to rely upon a prior judgment obtained
against a party in an action that the parties settled. In analyzing collateral
estoppel, courts and commentators have routinely drawn a distinction
between offensive and defensive use. Defensive collateral estoppel occurs
when a defendant attempts to preclude a plaintiff from litigating an issue that
the plaintiff has previously litigated unsuccessfully against another party.
Offensive use occurs when a plaintiff seeks to prevent the defendant from
litigating an issue that the defendant has previously litigated and lost in an
action with another party.76 By contrast, under the doctrine of res judicata-
also known as claim preclusion-the preclusive effects of a prior judgment
are limited to litigants who were actually parties to the litigation and their
privies.77 A prior judgment bars all future claims only between the litigating
parties that arise out of the same transaction.78
When settling cases that involve judgments on appeal, persons likely to
be parties in future litigations often are concerned about the res judicata and
74 See supra notes 3, 29.
75 See Barry v. Atkinson, 193 F.R.D. 197, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
76 See Fisch, supra note 3, at 614; Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive
Collateral Estoppel To Fulfill Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos
Litigation, 70 IoWA L. REv. 141, 150-52 (1984).
77 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 39-42 (1982).
78 See id. § 24(1).
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collateral estoppel effects of any adverse judgment.79 Indeed, it has been
aptly observed that "[a]lthough a rule of judicial procedure, preclusion
doctrine makes itself heard primarily outside the courtroom. ' 80 Res judicata
concerns can be addressed in most instances within the context of a
settlement agreement. Collateral estoppel cannot be so contained. Collateral
estoppel concerns are critical in the settlement of certain types of disputes.
For example, issue preclusion often occupies a central role in the settlement
of patent and trademark cases.81
To remove the ability of non-parties collaterally to use a judgment from
a settled case, vacatur provides the most certainty. Vacatur removes a
judgment from the record books and prevents any collateral estoppel (as well
as res judicata) consequences from occurring. 82 However, unlike other
79 For a discussion of the different incentives facing repeat litigants as compared to
one-time litigants, see Robert Scott Lewis, Recent Decision, U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co.
v. Bonner Mall Partnership: Settlement Conditioned on Vacatur?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 883,
884 (1996); Daniel Purcell, The Public Right to Precedent: A Theory and Rejection of
Vacatur, 85 CAL. L. REV. 867, 885-90 (1997); Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of
the System of Precedent: Selective Publication, Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 109, 131 (1995). See also Mark R. Kravitz, Appellate Law, Settling
Cases, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 26, 1999, at B17.
80 Bruce L. Hay, Some Settlement Effects of Preclusion, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 21, 51.
81 See, e.g., Aqua Marine Supply v. Aim Machining, Inc., 247 F.3d 1216, 1218
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing fact that settlement provided for vacatur of district court
judgment invalidating patent); Nestle Co., v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 281 (2d
Cir. 1985) (stating Nestle insisted on vacatur of district court's judgment invalidating its
trademark "Toll House" as a condition of settlement so that the judgment would not
automatically prevent it through the operation of collateral estoppel from enforcing the
trademark in the future); Allen-Bradley Co. v. Kollmorgen Corp., 199 F.R.D. 316, 317
(E.D. Wis. 2001) (stating a settiement reached at district court level conditioned upon the
court vacating its patent claim construction order).
82 If a court orders vacatur of the judgment on appeal, its preclusive effect is
typically eliminated. See Russman v. The Board of Educ., 260 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir.
2001) ("We must now decide whether to vacate the district court's judgment and thereby
effectively deny its res judicata and precedential consequences."); Harris Trust & Sav.
Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 1138, 1146 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that a vacated judgment has no preclusive effect), aff'd, 510 U.S. 86 (1993); Pontarelli
Limousine, Inc. v. Chi., 929 F.2d 339, 340-41 (7th Cir. 1991); Dodrill v. Ludt, 764 F.2d
442, 444 (6th Cir. 1985); Zeneca, Ltd. v. Novapharm Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 193, 196 (D.
Md. 1996) ("As a general rule, a vacated judgment and the factual findings underlying it
have no preclusive effect; the judgment is a legal nullity."), aff'd, Il1 F.3d 144 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Chandler v. Sys. Council U-19, No. CV85-AR-1948-S, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18832, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 20, 1986) ("A decision which is vacated has no precedential
value, and for all intents and purposes never existed."). See also lB JAMES W. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.416[2] (2d ed. 1993); 13A WRIGHT ET AL.,
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aspects of a settlement agreement, the. parties cannot privately stipulate to
vacate a judgment. Vacatur is an equitable remedy that falls within a court's
discretionary powers.83 By statute, the Supreme Court and federal appellate
courts are empowered to vacate their own judgments and judgments of a
lower court.84 Moreover, appellate courts are authorized under Rule 33 of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to enter orders "implementing any
settlement agreement, ' 85 although the Rule and its accompanying Advisory
Note are silent regarding how a court should implement a settlement
agreement that provides for vacatur of a judgment on appeal. Federal district
courts are empowered to vacate their own decisions pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b).
86
In sum, vacatur can be a powerful settlement tool. Herein lies the fuel of
the vacatur debate: under what circumstances should courts grant such a
potent form of relief to assist settlement?
2. Positions Within Debate
It is not my intent, nor is it necessary for this Article, to discuss in depth
the full range of views within the active debate of the role of courts in
settlement.87 For purposes here, a brief summary will be provided of a
portion of this debate that focuses on whether post-judgment vacatur to
assist settlement is an appropriate remedy for courts to grant.
Two primary positions can be identified within the debate involving
vacatur and settlement. One views litigation chiefly as a public, rather than
private, event. Scholars and judges working within this framework contend
that courts must first and foremost consider the public impact of vacating
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3533.10 (Supp. 2001). But see
Chemetron Corp. v. Bus. Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1190 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that a
defendant could be collaterally estopped from relitigating facts which have been decided
adversely in a prior case even though factual findings in prior case set aside by trial judge
when case was dismissed as a result of settlement), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S.
1007 (1983).
83 See infra Parts III.B-III.D.
8428 U.S.C. § 2106 (1994).
85 FED. R. APP. P. 33.
86 Rule 60(b) permits a court to relieve a party from an adverse judgment on
grounds which include fraud, mistake, newly discovered evidence, and satisfaction of
judgment. The Rule also includes a catch-all provision that allows relief from a judgment
for "any other reasons justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." A litigant
may also bring a motion to vacate under Rule 59(e), which permits motions to alter or
amend ajudgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b).
87 See supra note 6.
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any judicial decision. They contend that the very purpose and integrity of the
judicial system is at stake when courts vacate decisions to assist
settlements.88 More specifically, under a common law system where
significant reliance is placed on prior cases for establishing and articulating
the society's rule of law, vacatur to assist private settlements seriously
undermines the legal system itself by tampering with precedent. As
articulated by one court:
When a clash between genuine adversaries produces a precedent ... the
judicial system ought not to allow the social value of that precedent, created
at cost to the public and other litigants, to be a bargaining chip in the
process of settlement. The precedent, a public act of a public official, is not
the parties' property.89
The other view sees litigation primarily as a private event between the
parties and not a public one. The primary function of litigation is viewed as
the resolution of private disputes and, as such, the private interests of the
litigants in resolving their dispute should be paramount.90 If courts deny a
vacatur request needed to effectuate a settlement, the litigants are forced to
assume the role of "private attorneys general." 91 Such a denial compels the
parties to litigate on behalf of the public interest, rather than in pursuit of
their private goals and distorts the purpose of the legal system, including the
creation of reliable precedent.
B. U.S. Supreme Court's "Exceptional Circumstances " Standard
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of vacatur in
the context of settlement by highlighting the non-prevailing party's role in
88 See Luban, supra note 6, at 2622-26; Resnick, Whose Judgment?, supra note 6,
at 1501-04. See generally Fisch, supra note 3; Steven R. Harmon, Comment, Unsettling
Settlements: Should Stipulated Reversals Be Allowed to Trump Judgments' Collateral
Estoppel Effects Under Neary?, 85 CAL. L. REv. 479, 521-26 (1997).
89 In re Mem'l Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988).
90 See Fisch, supra note 3, at 621-24; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against
Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV.
485, 487 (1985); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 2669-70. See also Sarah Rudolph
Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute
Resolution, 51 HASTINGs L.J. 1199, 1204 (2000).
91 See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkts., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (discounting public
interest involved in vacatur decision, court found "no justification to force these
defendants, who wish only to settle the present litigation, to act as unwilling private
attorneys general and to bear the various costs and risks of litigation").
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requiring such relief and stressing the importance of an orderly judicial
process. The most recent standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court is
set forth in Bonner Mall,92 in which the Court held that when an appeal
becomes moot because of settlement, the resulting dismissal or withdrawal
does not justify vacatur, absent "exceptional circumstances. 93
The procedural and factual history of Bonner Mall is particularly unique.
The petitioner, Bancorp, held a mortgage on certain properties owned by
Bonner Mall, which had filed for bankruptcy. Bancorp had successfully
petitioned the bankruptcy court to suspend the automatic stay of foreclosure
sale against Bonner Mall, which Bonner Mall appealed. 94 On appeal, the
district court reversed the decision, which Bancorp then appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and Bancorp
petitioned for a writ of certiorari. 95 After the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari and received the parties' briefs on the merits, the parties stipulated
to a consensual plan of reorganization, which the bankruptcy court approved.
The parties agreed that their settlement "mooted the case," including the
pending appeal before the Court.96 Bancorp filed a motion with the Court
requesting that it vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2106, which allows an appellate court to "affirm, modify, vacate, set aside
or reverse any judgment, decree, or order" on appeal. 97 Bonner Mall
opposed the motion to vacate. 98 The Court "set the vacatur question for
briefing and argument."99
The precise issue addressed in Bonner Mall was whether federal
appellate courts should vacate civil judgments of lower courts in cases that
are settled after an appeal is filed or certiorari sought. 100 Two concerns
drove the Court's analysis. The first was whether a party had voluntarily
abandoned its right to review. 10 1 The second was whether the public interest
would be served or compromised by vacatur under the circumstances.
The Court stressed that to "allow a party who steps off the statutory path
to employ the secondary remedy of vacatur as a refined form of collateral
92 U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 20.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1994).
98 BonnerMall, 513 U.S. at 20.
99 See also Resnick, Whose Judgment?, supra note 6, at 1481-82.
100 Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 19.
101 Id. at 25.
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attack on the judgment would-quite apart from the considerations of
fairness to the parties--disturb the orderly operation of the federal judicial
system." 102 The Court emphasized that judicial decisions "are not merely the
property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that
the public interest would be served by vacatur." 10 3 A vacatur order can be
neither purchased nor parleyed by the parties. To provide otherwise would
disrupt the orderly functioning of the judicial system and its development of
precedent.
The Court further reasoned,
[W]hile the availability of vacatur may facilitate settlement after the
judgment under review has been rendered and certiorari granted (or appeal
filed), it may deter settlement at an earlier stage. Some litigants, at least,
may think it worthwhile to roll the dice rather than settle in the district court,
or in the court of appeals, if, but only if, an unfavorable outcome can be
washed away by a settlement-related vacatur. And the judicial economies
achieved by settlement at the district-court level are ordinarily much more
extensive than those achieved by settlement on appeal. We find it quite
impossible to assess the effect of our holding, either way, upon the
frequency or systemic value of settlement. 104
The Court ended its analysis with an open-ended qualification: "This is
not to say that vacatur can never be granted when mootness is produced in
that fashion.... Exceptional circumstances may conceivably counsel in
favor of such a course." 105
Prior to Bonner Mall, the Court's leading case on vacatur was United
States v. Munsingwear, Inc.10 6 In Munsingwear, the United States sought a
holding from the Supreme Court that the doctrine of res judicata did not
apply to a second and later lawsuit between the United States and
Munsingwear. The first lawsuit, which alleged violations of price-fixing
regulations, had been litigated only as to injunctive relief in Munsingwear's
favor.10 7 Although the government appealed the decision while the appeal
was pending, the relevant commodity was deregulated for the time period at
issue in the first lawsuit. Munsingwear moved for dismissal of the appeal on
102 Id. at 27.
103 Id. at 26-27 (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips
Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
104 Id. at 27-28.
105 Id. at 29.
106 U.S. v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
107 Id. at 37.
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the grounds of mootness, which was granted.108 When the United States later
commenced a second lawsuit involving the same commodity that covered a
later time period, Munsingwear moved to dismiss the action under the
doctrine of res judicata. The United States opposed the motion by arguing
that the prior decision was not binding under the doctrine of res judicata
because during the pendency of the appeal of that decision, the issue had
become moot because of a change in regulations.
10 9
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court found that the United States
never attempted to preserve its rights by moving for vacatur of the prior
decision and thus "having slept on its rights," 110 could not now complain.
However, the Court importantly noted that when a party was prevented from
obtaining appellate review through no fault of its own-characterized by the
Court as "happenstance,"--res judicata should not apply because it would
result in unfair prejudice."'I
In sum, party conduct is a critical component in Bonner Mall and its
predecessor when deciding whether vacatur is appropriate. Bonner Mall also
stresses the broader concerns of public interest and the orderly operation of
the judicial system in its analysis.
C. Circuit Case Law on Vacatur and Lack of Consideration of
Programs
Despite the particularly unique factual circumstances of Bonner Mall-
the request for vacatur of a circuit court judgment (as opposed to a district
court judgment) and opposition to vacatur by one of the settling parties-
circuit courts have not viewed its holding within the case's narrow factual
confines. Instead, courts have applied the Bonner Mall prong focused on
party conduct rigidly to all types of vacatur requests made to assist
settlement, including those jointly made by the settling parties for district
court judgments on appeal. 112 Applying the Bonner Mall "exceptional




III Id. at 40.
112 The Bonner Mall rule is especially broad, and has been criticized on this basis.
See 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION 2d (2d ed. 1984).
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requests to assist settlement. 113 For the majority of circuits, "exceptional
circumstances" does not include assisting a settlement, regardless of whether
113 See Aqua Marine Supply v. Aim Machining, Inc., 247 F.3d 1216, 1221 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (stating vacatur not appropriate because losing party's own actions resulted in
appeal being mooted, even though settlement agreement provided for joint proposed
vacatur order to be submitted to district court which court declined); Salovaara v. Jackson
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 289, 296 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Because mootness by reason of a
settlement is a result of the voluntary actions of the party, it does not justify vacatur of a
federal civil judgment under review."); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 231 F.3d 694, 700 (10th
Cir. 2000) (denying request for vacatur because appeal was rendered moot by settlement
between the parties rather than unilateral action of appellee); Van Eeton v. Beebe, No.
99-35470, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22741, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2000) (denying vacatur
request, appeal did not become moot due to circumstances unattributable to appellant or
other parties); In re W. Pac. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (10th Cir.
1999) (denying request for vacatur because appellants voluntarily contributed to the
mootness of the appeal); Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) ("If
mootness can be traced to actions of the party seeking vacatur, the decision of the lower
court will usually be allowed to stand."); GST Tucson Lightwave, Inc. v. Tucson, No. 97-
15328, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1498, at *9-10 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 1998) (dismissing appeal
and denying vacatur); Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 96-1426,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 28826, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1997) (dismissing appeal and
denying vacatur after appellant moved to vacate order of district court and to voluntarily
dismiss appeal as moot by virtue of settlement agreement with appellee); Bank One Chi.,
N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., No. 93-3251, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6515, at *2
(7th Cir. Mar. 21, 1996) (On remand from reversal of appellate court decision by U.S.
Supreme Court, the parties submitted a Rule 54 statement informing the court that they
had entered into a settlement agreement. They jointly asked the appellate court to remand
to the district court with instructions to vacate its opinion and judgment order and to
dismiss the suit. Citing Bonner Mall, the court stated that "We are not at liberty to
enforce the parties' agreement as to vacatur,... but we order the case dismissed pursuant
to their mutual request and Fed. R. App. P. 42(b)."); Nahrebeski v. Cincinnati Milacron
Mktg. Co., 41 F.3d 1221, 1222 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding no "exceptional circumstances"
present to vacate, and dismissing as moot the parties joint request for vacatur of the
district court judgment and dismissal of appeal because of settlement). See also Mahoney
v. Babbitt, 113 F.3d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (fitting squarely within Bonner Mall
vacatur analysis of voluntary abandonment and vacatur not appropriate, because losing
party elected not to appeal emergency order); 19 Solid Waste Dep't Mech. v.
Albuquerque, 76 F.3d 1142, 1144 (10th Cir. 1996) (denying city's request for vacatur
because city rendered case moot by voluntarily withdrawing the policy invalidated by the
district court); Cobb Publ'g, Inc. v. Hearst Corp., No. 95-2033, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
16656, at *1-3 (6th Cir. June 17, 1996) (dismissing appeal and denying defendant-
appelant's request for vacatur after interlocutory disqualification order appealed,
underlying case settled and as part of settlement agreement, plaintiffs-appellees agreed
not to participate in the appeal); Lewis, supra note 79, at 891.
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dismissal of the appeal is contingent upon vacatur or not.1 14 These courts
maintain that the equitable remedy of vacatur should only be granted to
parties who are precluded from appealing a decision because of events
outside their control. 115 Indeed, it is viewed as an abuse of judicial power to
grant vacatur when a party knowingly foregoes its right to appeal because of
settlement. Vacatur to assist settlements "condone[s] wasteful utilization of
the court's resources and encourage[s] future litigants to hedge their bets by
postponing settlement until after learning of the opinion of the court. 11 6
The Second Circuit, however, espouses an arguably broader view of
Bonner Mall in some circumstances. In Microsoft Corp. v. Bristol
Technology, Inc.,117 Microsoft filed a notice of appeal and soon thereafter
the parties reached a settlement. However, "[tlhe settlement agreement was
entered [into] with the understanding that Bristol would not oppose
Microsoft's motion for vacatur of the district court's order on punitive and
injunctive relief."118 The Second Circuit panel observed that the prior
practice in the circuit "ha[d] been to vacate district court judgments when a
settlement moots the controversy."' 119 However, the court stated that the
Bonner Mall decision "raised the bar appreciably" when the Supreme Court
ruled that mootness by settlement is insufficient to overcome opposing
considerations, which included the benefits society derive from "the
resolution of legal questions through orderly procedures."' 120
Working within the language of Bonner Mall and its "exceptional
circumstances" standard, the court reviewed prior Second Circuit decisions
114 See supra note 113. See also Woodland v. Houston, No. 96-20358, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 34395 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 1996) (without articulating the exceptional
circumstances, court granted appellant's motion to vacatur, stating, "We are persuaded
that the circumstances are here exceptional, apart from the agreement to vacate, which
alone would not be sufficient").
115 See e.g., Amoco, 231 F.3d at 698. See also U.S. v. Jenks, 129 F.3d 1348, 1352
(10th Cir. 1997) (vacating district court judgment because prevailing party's unilateral
action rendered case moot); Jones v. Temmer, 57 F.3d 921, 923 (10th Cir. 1995)
(granting vacatur because change in law caused mootness). But see McClendon v.
Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 868 (10th Cir. 1996) (granting request for vacatur of
judgment even though government's own remedial measures mooted its appeal because
the actions deemed not a manipulation of the judicial process).
116 Austin v. Ford, 181 F.R.D. 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing relevant Supreme
Court and Second Circuit cases).
117 Microsoft Corp. v. Bristol Tech., Inc., 250 F.3d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 2001).
118Id. at 153-54.
119 Id. at 154 (citing Nestle Co., Inc., v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 283 (2d
Cir. 1985)).
120 Id.
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where vacatur was granted and concluded that, "the exceptional
circumstances had to do with the facilitation of settlements that would
obviate pending appeals." 12 1 The Second Circuit is in the minority by
reading Bonner Mall in this fashion. Moreover, in Bristol the pending appeal
was already obviated by the settlement. However, the court nonetheless
granted vacatur for another reason not articulated in Bonner Mall-the
correctness of the lower court decision. In Bristol, it was "unclear" whether
the district court had the power to reach the punitive damages issue.
122
When evaluating a vacatur request under either a narrow or broad
reading of Bonner Mall, party participation in appellate mediation programs
only has been mentioned on rare occasions. In Major League Baseball
Properties, Inc. v. Pacific Trading Cards, Inc.,123 after losing a preliminary
injunction motion, plaintiff-appellant Major League sought an injunction
pending appeal from the Second Circuit. 124 During oral argument, the panel
suggested that the parties attempt to negotiate a settlement and assigned
court staff counsel to mediate their discussions.12 5 At the end of the day, a
121 Id. at 154-55 (citing Major League Baseball Prop., Inc. v. Pac. Trading Cards,
Inc., 150 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 1998); Keller v. Mobil Corp., 55 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 1995)).
122 Id. at 152. Another circuit opinion also factored into its exceptional
circumstances determination the likelihood that the lower court was incorrect as well as
the subject matter of the appeal. See In re Gen. Motors Corp., No. 94-2435, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 41270, at *4-5 (4th Cir. Feb. 17, 1995) (vacating a district court discovery
order requiring the production of attorney-client documents in a case that had been
settled). The district court order in General Motors was on appeal before the Fourth
Circuit on a writ of mandamus and after argument, the case was settled. The order was
then used in another case to require the production of the same documents. The court in
finding "exceptional circumstances" stated that "[w]hat is at issue here is a claim of
privilege, a matter that should not be taken lightly," and the court concluded that the
district court order was incorrect. Some sharp lawyering practice appeared to motivate the
courts, as well. Id.
123 Major League Baseball Prop., Ins. v. Pac. Trading Cards, Inc., 150 F.3d 149 (2d
Cir. 1998).
124 Id. at 150. Appellant Major League Baseball brought a trademark infringement
and unfair competition suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York against Pacific Trading Cards, Inc. ("Pacific"), alleging that Pacific was
manufacturing and distributing baseball trading cards depicting major league baseball
players wearing Major League trademarked uniforms. Id. Major League had granted
Pacific licenses to issue trading cards in past years with the understanding that Pacific
could not use Major League's trademarks (here, the uniforms) without Major League's
consent. Id. However, Major League refused to grant Pacific a license for its current set
of cards. Id. To prevent the distribution of the alleged unauthorized cards, Major League
requested a preliminary injunction from the district court. Id.
125 Id. at 151.
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settlement was reached, contingent upon vacatur of the district court
decision. Without such a vacatur, Major League would be unable to settle
because it would be subject to the defense of acquiescence in future
trademark cases with other alleged infringers. 126 The Second Circuit found
that "exceptional circumstances" existed and vacated the district court
opinion. 127 The court explicitly mentioned its involvement in directing the
parties into mediation when explaining its finding of exceptional
circumstances. 12
8
Although decided prior to Bonner Mall, another case of note in
connection with appellate mediation programs is also from the Second
Circuit. In Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, Inc.,129 the parties settled the
matter within the court's CAMP program.130 The settlement provided for
resolution of both the pending appeal and the other claims that remained
pending in the district court. However, the settlement agreement was
contingent upon the district court's vacatur of a partial summary judgment
granted against the plaintiff on the defendant's trademark claim, which was
being appealed. The district court denied the parties' motion to vacate,
131
which, the Second Circuit reversed by finding that the trial court had
"abused its discretion." 132 In Nestle, the court concluded that the trial court's
reliance on the public interest in finality of judgments was misplaced, and
the importance of promoting settlement superseded any interest in
finality. 133 The Nestle case is of note because critics have suggested that the
"decision stemmed from the Second Circuit's desire to uphold a settlement,
which had been arranged through the CAMP process and that the Second
126 Id. at 152.
127 Id. The court's order read in pertinent part, "[W]e find that exceptional
circumstances exist and that it is equitable to order vacatur of the District Court opinion
and judgment in light of our determination that these exceptional circumstances outweigh
the considerations concerning the public interest or the administration of justice
identified in [Bonner Mall]." Id.
128 Id., see infra Part V.A.
129 Nestle Co., Inc., v. Chester's Mkt. Inc., 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985).
130 See supra Part II.A.
131 Nestle Co., Inc., v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1445, 1445 (D. Conn.
1984), rev'd, 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985).
132 Nestle, 756 F.2d at 280.
133 Id.
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Circuit's infatuation with the CAMP procedure motivated its decision more
than the general goal of encouraging settlement."
134
D. District Court Vacatur Decisions and Lack of Discussion of
Programs
In addition to circuit courts being able to vacate district court decisions
on appeal, district courts also have the authority to vacate such judgments
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 135 Indeed, in Bonner Mall the
U.S. Supreme Court stated that an appellate court could refer the vacatur
issue to the lower court, instead of deciding the issue itself.136 Many courts'
mediation programs inform parties of this option.
137
When a judgment is on appeal, two procedural approaches exist to direct
the vacatur request to the district court. One approach is for the circuit court
to conditionally dismiss the appeal, which divests the circuit court of
jurisdiction and remands the case to the lower court. The other available
approach is under Rule 60(b), which does not require a conditional dismissal
of the appeal; however, Rule 60(b) allows the district court to indicate
whether or not it would grant the motion should the case be remanded.
138 If
134 Fisch, supra note 3, at 603 n.76; See also Mary A. Donovan & Marya Lenn Yee,
Letting the Chips Fall: The Second Circuit's Decision on Toll House, 52 BROOK. L. REV.
1029, 1030-31 (1986).
135 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A court can relieve a party from a final judgment or order
for several enumerate reasons, including the satisfaction, release or discharge of a
judgment, or for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See also Evans v. Mullins, 130 F. Supp. 2d 774, 775 n.l (W.D. Va.
2001).
136 U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994).
Even prior to Bonner Mall, the Ninth Circuit had adopted this practice. See Nat'l Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1989); Ringsby Truck Lines,
Inc., v. W. Conference of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 722-23 (9th Cir. 1982) (dismissing
the case and allowing the district court to determine whether its decision should be
vacated).
137 Examples include the Second Circuit CAMP, Third Circuit Appellate Mediation
Program, Fifth Circuit Appellate Conference Program, Sixth Circuit Mediation
Conference Program, Seventh Circuit Settlement Conference Program, Ninth Circuit
Settlement Program, Eleventh Circuit Mediation Office. Telephone interviews with
circuit court mediators (Oct. 2, 2000-May 25, 2001) (notes on file with author). See also
Pressley Ridge Schs. v. Shimer, 134 F.3d 1218, 1222 (4th Cir. 1998); Nahrebeski v.
Cincinnati Milacron Mktg. Co., 41 F.3d 1221, 1222 (8th Cir. 1994).
138 See Toliver v. Co. of Sullivan, 957 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1992); Aune v.
Reynders, 344 F.2d 835, 841 (10th Cir. 1965); Ryan v. U.S. Lines Co., 303 F.2d 430,
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a district court is inclined to grant the motion, it may issue a short
memorandum so stating its inclination. The movant can then file a motion
with the court of appeals asking for a limited remand of the pending appeal
to obtain the vacatur decision from the district court.139 Should the district
court deny the motion, 140 the notice of appeal from such a denial can be
consolidated with the appeal already pending.
141
Once a vacatur request is procedurally before a district court, the court
must determine whether to apply the Bonner Mall "exceptional
circumstances" standard or the more general discretionary Rule 60(b)
standard. The circuits that have addressed this issue differ.142 In Valero
434 (2d Cir. 1962); Carter v. Rosenberg & Estis, P.C., No. 95CIV.10439, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 131, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1999).
139 See Fobian v. Storage Tech. Corp., 164 F.3d 887, 891 (4th Cir. 1999). See
generally Scott B. Smith, Settling Federal Cases on Appeal: A Trap for the Unwary, 61
ALA. LAWYER 396 (2000).
14 0 The pending appeal does not divest a district court of its power to deny a vacatur
motion under Rule 60(b) motion, although the court cannot grant such a motion unless
the case is remanded to it. See Carter v. Rosenberg & Etis, P.C., No. 95 CIV. 10439,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13 1, at * 4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1999). Moreover, even if a vacatur
request is denied by the circuit court, such a denial does not preclude the parties from
seeking vacatur from the district court. See Morton v. Gober, No. 99-7191, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22464, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 17, 2000) (noting the question exists whether
vacatur serves the public interest and the "proper course" is to have lower court
determine the issue); GST Tucson Lightwave, Inc., v. Tucson, No. 97-15328, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1498, at *10 (holding appeal dismissal and vacatur denial do not preclude
district court from vacating its own judgment); Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., No. 96-1426,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 28826, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1997) (dismissing appeal,
denying vacatur, and instructing appellant to present its motion to vacatur to district
court, case remand to district court with instruction to consider Philips' request to vacate
the attorney fees order of district court after appellant moved to vacate order of district
court and to voluntarily dismiss appeal as moot by virtue of settlement agreement with
appellee); Nahrebeski, 41 F.3d at 1222. In Nahrebeski, the parties jointly requested a
dismissal of appeal, because the case had been settled, and requested the district court
judgment to be vacated. The court of appeal held that no "exceptional circumstances"
present to vacate; the appeal was dismissed as moot "without prejudice to the right of
either party to move the District Court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) that it vacate its
judgment." Id.
141 See Fobian, 164 F.3d at 891.
142 Compare Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 121 (4th Cir. 2000)
(holding Bonner Mall standard "largely determinative" at district court level), and Evans
v. Mullins, 130 F. Supp. 2d 774, 776 (W.D. Va. 2001) (citing Valero to support "a
district court's decision whether to vacate its own judgment is equitable in nature, and
that there is a general presumption against vacatur."), with Am. Games, Inc. v. Trade
Prods., Inc., 142 F.3d 1164, 1167-70 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding district courts should have
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Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige,143 the Fourth Circuit stated that the "standards"
for vacatur due to mootness related to settlement under Rule 60(b) are
"essentially the same" as the Bonner Mall standard applicable to appellate
courts. 144 The court held that the Bonner Mall "considerations that are
relevant to appellate vacatur for mootness are also relevant to, and likewise
largely determinative of, a district court's vacatur decision for mootness
under Rule 60(b)(6)."'145 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, however, maintain
that district courts have broader discretion under Rule 60(b) than appellate
courts do under Bonner Mall.146 According to decisions in these circuits, a
district court may vacate its own judgment even in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, provided that the Rule 60(b) "balancing of
equities" test is satisfied.
At the district court level, many courts have applied the reasoning of
Bonner Mall to Rule 60(b) motions to vacate judgments as part of a
settlement arrangement, 147 with differing results.1 48 In those existing
broader discretion than Bonner Mall standard to make the equitable determination
whether to grant vacatur or not), and Nahrebeski, 41 F.3d at 1222 (8th Cir. 1994).
143 Valero, 211 F.3d at 112.
144 Id. at 117.
14 5 Id. at 121.
146 See Am. Games, 142 F.3d at 1167-69; Nahrebeski, 41 F.3d at 1222.
147 See, e.g., Allen-Bradley Co. v. Kollmorgen Corp., 199 F.R.D. 316, 318 (E.D.
Wis. 2001) (stating "much of the underlying justification" in Bonner Mall can be
"usefully employed" in determining vacatur request by district court); Dubrowsky v.
Estate of Perlbinder, 268 B.R. 6, 8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2001) (applying Bonner Mall
standard); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 657, 661-62 (D. Utah
1999) (applying Bonner Mall standard); Carter v. Rosenberg & Estis, No. 95 CIV 10439,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1999) (relying upon Bonner Mall);
In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 220 B.R. 909, 917 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998) (holding the
rationale announced in Bonner Mall applies to vacatur request); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. Cohen, No. 92CIV9500 (LMM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16017, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (citing Bonner Mall in articulating standard); Avellino v. Herron, 181 F.R.D. 294,
297 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (applying Bonner Mall standard); Jewelers Vigilance Comm., Inc. v.
Vitale Inc., 177 F.R.D. 184, 186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying Bonner Mall standard to
vacatur motion under Rule 60(b)); Vladimir v. U.S. Banknote Corp., 976 F. Supp. 266,
267 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (considering requirements of Bonner Mall); Keeler v. Mayor and
City Council of Cumberland, 951 F. Supp. 83, 84 (D. Md. 1997) (applying Bonner Mall
standard to vacatur motion under Rule 60(b)); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Cohen, No.
92CIV9500 (LMM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16017, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing
Bonner Mall in articulating standard); Agee v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 932 F.
Supp. 85, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying Bonner Mall standard to Rule 60(b) motion);
Lindsey v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 929 F. Supp. 1435, 1436 (D. Wyo. 1996) (citing Bonner
Mall in articulating considerations); Stolz v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., 922
F. Supp. 435, 436 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (applying Bonner Mall principles at district court
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decisions where the court noted that settlement occurred within the context
of an appellate mediation program, that factor attracted no consideration
other than a passing reference in describing the factual background.
149
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING THE BONNER MALL STANDARD WITHIN
APPELLATE MEDIATION FRAMEWORK
What are the implications of the concurrent, yet wholly uncoordinated,
development of case law standards for post-judgment vacatur to assist
settlement and the growing institutionalization of court appellate mediation
programs? Consider the following scenarios:
level); Krolikowski v. Volanti, No. 95 C 1254, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11228, at *4-5
(N.D. IIl. Aug. 1, 1996) (relying upon "principles enunciated" in Bonner Mall); Bailey v.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Va., 878 F. Supp. 54, 55 (E.D. Va. 1995) (applying Bonner
Mall standard to vacatur motion under Rule 60(b)); Alexander v. Perrill, 872 F. Supp.
722 (D. Ariz. 1995) (applying Bonner Mall standard); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Cohen, No. 92CIV9500 (LMM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16017, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (citing Bonner Mall in articulating standard).
148 Compare Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah
1999) (citing and following Bonner Mall, granting vacatur motion), Alexander v. Perrill,
872 F. Supp. 722 (D. Ariz. 1995) (citing and following Bonner Mall, granting vacatur
motion), Vladimir, 976 F. Supp. at 267-68 (considering the requirements of Bonner
Mall, and finding "special circumstances"), Lindsey, 929 F. Supp. at 1436 (finding
"ample exceptional circumstances" to justify vacatur as requested by the parties), Nat '
Union Fire, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16017 (citing Bonner Mall in articulating standard
and grants vacatur), and In re Fairchild, 220 B.R. at 297 (granting vacatur and
emphasizing "extraordinary nature of relief requested" and "equitable circumstances"
present), with Carter, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131, at *10 (denying request to vacate),
Agee, 932 F. Supp. at 88 (denying request for vacatur), Jewelers Vigilance, 177 F.R.D. at
188 (denying request for vacatur), Keeler, 951 F. Supp. at 85 (denying request for
vacatur), Bailey, 878 F. Supp. at 56 (denying request for vacatur), Avellino, 181 F.R.D. at
297-98 (denying request for vacatur), Krolikowski, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11228, at
*10 (denying request for vacatur), Austin, 181 F.R.D. at 286 (denying request to vacatur),
Allen-Bradley, 199 F.R.D. at 320 (denying request to vacate), and Stolz, 922 F. Supp. at
437 (denying request to vacate).
149 See, e.g., Lindsey, 929 F. Supp. at 1435 (ordering parties to submit to non-
binding mediation); Stolz, 922 F. Supp. at 435 (involving parties' request to vacate after
settlement reached in mediation pursuant to the Ninth Circuit mediation program); In re
Fairchild, 220 B.R. at 17 (noting case settled within the Sixth Circuit mediation
program); Russell v. Tumbaugh, 774 F. Supp. 597 (involving litigants who informed
Tenth Circuit at conference that if district court orders were vacated, they would stipulate
to dismiss the case with prejudice and withdraw the appeal); Nestle Co. v. Chester's
Mkt., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1445, 1446 (mentioning Second Circuit CAMP program), rev'd,
756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Scenario One. An appellate mediation program is in place, which
mandates participation. Counsel duly participate with "as much authority as
feasible" to settle the case.150 The mediation is held and a settlement is
reached that is contingent upon obtaining vacatur of the lower court
judgment. Will a court-whether at the circuit or district court level-deny
the request because the appellant fits within the group of litigants that the
Bonner Mall Court categorized as voluntarily "stepping off' the appellate
review path?151 Most likely yes, under the present standard focused on
whether a party's voluntary conduct caused the mootness of an appeal. Yet,
is not a core purpose of appellate mediation programs to encourage and in
most instances, require parties to temporarily step off the appeal track to
explore whether a consensual resolution can be reached?
Scenario Two. A mediation is scheduled in a circuit program that allows
a party to opt out under certain circumstances if a party so requests. Both
parties participate in the mediation and a settlement is reached that is
contingent upon obtaining vacatur of the lower court judgment. When
assessing the vacatur request, will a court view the appellant as "stepping
off' the appeal path because it participated in a successful mediation? If so,
should appellate mediation programs be required to disclose to parties prior
to participation that if vacatur of the lower court judgment is required for
settlement, participation is a futile exercise?
The above two scenarios begin to demonstrate the anomalies that can
arise when a vacatur request results from participation in an appellate
mediation program. The consequences include strained judicial reasoning,
less effective appellate mediation programs, and the specter of diminishment
of public confidence in the orderly operation of the judicial system because
case law and court programs are at cross-purposes.
A. Strains Judicial Reasoning
From the very start, the Bonner Mall framework is strained when applied
to consensual settlements reached during appellate mediation programs.
First, the Bonner Mall standard was created in the context of a vacatur
request that was opposed by one of the settling parties. 152 Within appellate
mediation programs, the goal is to assist the parties reach a consensus on
settlement terms, and any resulting, unopposed vacatur requests should not
be forced into the narrow Bonner Mall framework. Second, the Bonner Mall
150 See supra Part II.C.
151 See supra Part II.B.
152 See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 20 (1994).
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Court was faced with a vacatur request of a circuit court opinion. By
contrast, at issue in an appellate mediation program is an unreviewed district
court opinion. Concerns about the impact of vacatur on precedent for
unreviewed district court decisions should not be viewed in the same
pressing manner as vacating circuit court decisions. Unlike appellate court
decisions, district court opinions are not considered binding precedent in
other cases. 15
3
Moreover, a party who voluntarily settles a pending appeal and seeks
vacatur of the lower court judgment as part of that settlement carries an
extremely heavy burden under the current application of Bonner Mall.
Absent "extraordinary circumstances," the vacatur request will not be
granted because of the party's voluntary conduct in mooting the appeal by
settling.154 The anomaly that arises, however, is when the vacatur request is
part of a settlement that occurred in the context of a court mediation program
that has the exploration and expedition of settlement as its primary focus.
155
The courts benefit greatly from settlements that occur in these appellate
mediation programs that they established and in which they place parties.
Absent participation in the program, which is often mandatory, the
settlement may very well have not occurred. Why should the appellant have
to bear all of the responsibility for abandonment of an appeal in this context?
Moreover, how "voluntary" should the abandonment of the appeal be
deemed?
Under vacatur case law, courts ignore the impact of these judicial
programs, including their mandatory components, in any settlement-related
vacatur request. However, circuit courts are managing their dockets in part
by using court mediation programs, financing these programs with public
funds, actively assisting parties in exploring settlement options, and
requiring participation in the programs in most instances. 156 Judicial
reasoning under these circumstances that denies a resulting vacatur request
153 See, e.g., Russman v. Bd. of Educ., 260 F.3d 114, 122 n.2 (2d Cir.
2001) ("When a case becomes moot in one of the Court of Appeals, [as opposed to at the
Supreme Court], it is usually a district court's decision that will be vacated, and its
precedential value is, of course, limited to only its persuasive effect."); In Design v. K-
Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding even an affirmance
without opinion of district court ruling not deemed a precedent); Ying Jing Gan v. N.Y.,
996 F.2d 522, 529-30 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding qualified immunity only available based
on Supreme Court and circuit court rulings); IBM Credit Corp. v. United Homes for
Aged Hebrews, 848 F. Supp. 495, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding district court decision
not binding precedent).
154 See supra Part III.B.
155 See supra Parts II.B.-II.C.
156 See supra Part II.
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on the basis that the party voluntarily abandoned its appeal, without taking
into account the court's active role in leading parties towards settlement, is
incomplete.
Another strain on jurisprudential reasoning arises when a vacatur motion
to assist a settlement reached during mediation is denied on the basis of
diminishment of precedent. 157 By placing parties into mandatory mediation
programs with their core goal of assisting settlements, are not courts
themselves contributing to the diminishment of precedent? How can these
same courts deny a settlement-related vacatur request resulting from a court
mediation program on the grounds that precedent is being diminished?
Moreover, a review of other court practices weakens reliance upon loss
of precedence as a valid reason to deny vacatur to assist settlement.
Presently, many courts are sanctioning the use of mandatory arbitration
programs to resolve a wide array of contractual and statutory claims,
including consumer and employment claims. 158 However, arbitration
decisions generally do not create precedent for either the court or other
arbitrators facing the same issues. Moreover, as a docket management
technique, appellate courts have begun issuing unpublished opinions at an
increasing rate, which has caused concern for numerous reasons, including
the diminishment of precedent. 159 For courts to stress the loss of precedent
157 See supra Part III.
158 See Cole supra note 90, at 1199.
159 A hotly debated issue is court rules that bar the citation of unpublished circuit
court decisions as precedence or persuasive authorities. See Hart v. Massanari, No. 99-
36472, 2001 WL 1135601, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2001) (holding that unpublished
decisions cannot be cited in briefs, even as persuasive authorities); Anastasoff v. U.S.,
223 F.3d 898, 899-90 (8th Cir. 2000) (barring citation of unpublished decisions
unconstitutional), vacating as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (vacating and
remanding due to mootness). See also Jason Hoppin, Ninth Circuit Sticks to Its Opinion
Policy (Sept. 26, 2001), available at
http://store.law.com/search-resultsiontent.asp?lsrohtype=site&lqry=9th+circuit+sticks+to
+its+opinion+policy+brodttyp=&srchmode=quick&scope=l &lsrchconshd=&srchareaid=
; Ganzfried, supra note 16, at 532 ("Only the written opinion constitutes precedent
binding on subsequent panels of the court and on the district courts within the circuit.").
However, circuit courts are increasingly deciding appeals without publishing their
decisions. See MCKENNA ET AL., supra note 1, at 19, 21 tbls.1 1, 13 (reporting national
average of opinion publication percentages in twelve regional courts of appeals for 1998
was 28% as compared to 38% in 1987); Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule
for Unpublished Opinions: Do the Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts
Justify the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 235, 240 (1998). For example, in the
Ninth Circuit, where unpublished decisions cannot be cited in briefs even as persuasive
authorities, 84% of its cases are decided without publishing the decisions, the third
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as a reason to deny a settlement-related vacatur rings hollow under these
circumstances.1
60
B. Limits Effectiveness of Mediation Programs
Another anomaly that arises when the Bonner Mall standard is applied to
vacatur requests arising from appellate mediation programs involves the
effectiveness of the mediation process itself. Within an appellate mediation
program, by definition the lower court decision is the reason that the parties
are participating in the mediation. Yet, the Bonner Mall constraints prevent
parties and the mediator from fully and creatively exploring alternative
solutions to appeals by rigidly narrowing the options available for addressing
the lower court decision.
Moreover, a dilemma arises when an appealing party is ordered into
appellate mediation before the appeal can proceed. The appellate mediation
programs require a party's representative to possess settlement authority, 161
and a few programs explicitly require good faith participation. 162 If, as a
result of such participation, a settlement is reached that includes a vacatur
request, the appellant will be deemed to have voluntarily abandoned its
appeal-a factor that weighs heavily against vacatur. Under the current case
law standard, if the appellant needs the lower court decision to be vacated to
settle, participation in mediation can only be superficial.
C. Jeopardizes Public Confidence in Orderly Operation of Judiciary
In Bonner Mall, the U.S. Supreme Court stressed the importance of
public trust in the judicial system and its orderly operation. 163 The case law
reveals a great concern that such trust can be seriously undermined if
highest of any federal appellate court, according to statistics for the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts.
160See generally Douglas A. Berman & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, In Defense of Less
Precedential Opinions: A Reply to Chief Judge Martin, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2025, 2032 n.23
(1999).
161 See supra Part II.C.
162 Seesupra Part II.C.
163 U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1994).
See also Evans v. Mullins, 130 F. Supp. 2d 774, 777 (W.D. Va. 2001) (denying vacatur
on grounds that the public has an interest in the integrity of the judiciary and vacatur in
this case would undermine that interest); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F.
Supp. 1355, 1357-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying vacatur request after balancing
countervailing interests, stressing that by conditioning settlement and waiver of an appeal
upon vacatur "placed in issue the integrity of the judicial process").
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judgments and decisions are vacated purely on the basis of the parties'
settlement arrangement because the public will perceive courts and their
precedent as "for sale."' 164 However, missing from this analysis is the
potential damage that the judicial system suffers when courts fail to take into
account their role in placing parties into court-financed mediation programs
that encourage parties to reach a consensual resolution instead of continuing
their appeal.
The public, as taxpayers, subsidizes the appeal process and mediation
programs by bearing much of the costs of the public court system. 165 The
courts are spending public funds to create and operate these appellate
mediation programs to more efficiently manage their dockets by actively
assisting parties in finding solutions other than pursuing their appeal at
additional costs to the parties and the courts. Yet, when that cost-savings
process works by resulting in a settlement, if the settlement includes a
vacatur request, then a fundamental disjunction occurs. Not only have public
funds been used inefficiently by underwriting participation in the court
mediation program, the parties must continue their appeal, which will cost
additional public funds. Simply put, the public is providing funds for a
system that is at odds with itself. Is this an efficient use of the courts' and the
public's resources?
Such an inconsistent stance can only undermine public confidence and
trust in the orderly operation of the courts. These two lines of court
development-vacatur case law and appellate mediation programs-I
contend, need to be reconciled to maintain judicial integrity.
V. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: THE FACTORING OF APPELLATE MEDIATION
PROGRAMS INTO VACATUR CASE LAW
If the judicial system is to retain the public's confidence in its orderly
operation and, by extension, its integrity, several possible approaches to
reform exist. At one end of the spectrum is a reform proposal to simply
modify the screening process for appellate mediation programs. 166 Appellate
mediation programs could screen out cases when vacatur is required to settle
the case. 167 Requiring appellate mediation programs to conduct such a
164 Resnick, Managerial Judges, supra note 6, at 422-24. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note
6, at 1076-78.
165 See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why
Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 221, 259 (1999).
166 See supra Part II.B.3.
167 Some of the programs' screening guidelines are capable of identifying a vacatur
issue. See supra Part II.B.3.; infra pp. 425-30 app.
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screening disclose is on its face an easily implemented solution. 168 However,
this option moves the court appellate programs toward less inclusiveness and
thus, fewer opportunities for the court, parties, and public to reap the many
benefits of these programs.
169
At the other end of the reform spectrum is a proposal to reverse the
applicable standard. Instead of denying vacatur absent exceptional
circumstances, the case law (or legislation) could provide that post-judgment
vacatur to assist settlement should be granted, absent exceptional
circumstances. However, this reform path touches on many of the deep
jurisprudential and public policy issues underlying the vacatur debate 170 and
doubtless would require further study and development to justify the
adoption of this approach as a reform measure. 171
168 For example, the Eleventh Circuit Mediation Program has prepared a document
entitled Mediation and Guidelines for Effective Mediation Representation. The document
contains a section captioned "What Participants Can Expect," which includes the
following: "The parties and the mediator will then discuss [at the mediation], either
jointly or separately, and in no particular order, the following topics:... (7) any
procedural alternatives possibly applicable to the appeal (e.g., vacatur, remand, etc.)."
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MEDIATION PROGRAM, MEDIATION AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE
MEDIATION REPRESENTATION 18-19. Rather than wait to raise the issue after the
mediation is scheduled, a screening could occur for vacatur obstacles prior to holding any
mediation session.
169 See supra Part H.
170 See supra Part HI.A.
171 As an example of the trend against such a reverse presumption, two years before
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bonner Mall, the California Supreme Court reached
the opposite conclusion in Neary v. Regents of the University of California, 834 P.2d
119, 120 (Cal. 1992). Neary established that courts should ordinarily grant parties'
stipulated request for a reversal, absent "extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 120. The
court held that when the parties agree to settle their dispute, and as pait of their
settlement stipulate to a reversal of the trial court judgment, the court of appeal should
grant their request absent a "showing of extraordinary circumstances that warrant an
exception" to this general rule. Id. See generally, Harmon, supra note 85. However,
Justice J. Anthony Kline of the First District Court of Appeals, refused to apply the
Neary rule as a "matter of conscience" in a dissenting decision that received considerable
attention, including a charge by the California Commission on Judicial Performance. See
also Morrow v. Hood Communications, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4th 924, 926-28 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997) (Kline, J., dissenting). Effective January 1, 2000, the California legislature
passed legislation that brought California law more in line with Bonner Mall. See CAL.
Crv. P. CODE §§ 128(a)(8)(A), 128(a)(8)(B) (West 2000) (providing stipulation to reverse
judgment cannot be granted unless there is "no reasonable possibility that the interests of
nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal," and the reasons for
reversal "outweigh the erosion of public trust" that may result from such action and the
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In the middle of the reform spectrum is a proposal that advocates the
factoring into the case law of the court's active role in encouraging parties to
explore settlement through participation in appellate mediation programs.
The "factoring" approach would be applicable to vacatur analysis conducted
at either the circuit court or district court levels. For the reasons discussed
below, I propose this factoring approach as an effective solution, which
enables case law and appellate mediation programs to evolve in tandem.
A. Templates for "Factoring" Approach: Two Circuit Cases That
Include Court's Settlement Activities in Vacatur Analysis
Two circuit court decisions have opened the door to factoring into a
vacatur analysis the court's role in encouraging parties to explore settlement
along the prescribed appellate path. In both cases during appellate argument,
the courts urged the parties to explore settlement.172 Joint settlement-related
vacatur requests resulted and the courts granted them. Under the
circumstances, the panels hearing the appeals could not find that the
appellant "by its own initiative" abandoned its appeal when the court played
a role in moving the parties onto a settlement path.
17 3
In Motta v. District Director of Immigration & Naturalization
Services,174 the First Circuit vacated a district court's decision in aid of
settlement after finding exceptional circumstances were present. During oral
argument, the panel of judges "raised with counsel the possibility that a
settlement might be in the best interests of both parties."' 175 At the end of the
argument, the court directed counsel to explore settlement and to advise the
court within ten days. 176 Thereafter, the parties reached a settlement that
included a request to vacate the lower court's decision. The First Circuit
"risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial
settlement").
172 Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Pac. Trading Cards, Inc., 150 F.3d 149,
151-52 (2d Cir. 1998); Motta v. Dist. Dir. of INS, 61 F.3d 117, 118 (1st Cir. 1995).
173 Major League, 150 F.3d. at 152; Motta, 61 F.3d at 118.
174 Motta, 61 F.3d at 118.
175 Id.
176 INS counsel explained that any consensual resolution could require vacating the
lower court's decision, because INS was concerned about "establishing what [it] sees as a
dangerous and erroneous precedent." Id. The case involved INS as a party; as a result, it
had not been placed in the First Circuit's mandatory CAMP program because such cases
are exempted from the program. See NIEMIC, supra note 1, at 18.
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found that the "equities favor vacatur" 177 and explicitly acknowledged the
role of the court in moving the parties toward settlement:
[The INS] has agreed to consider settlement only at the suggestion of this
Court, the proposed settlement being an inexpensive, simple, and speedy
way to accommodate the interests of both parties. As the INS has not
initiated the relinquishment of its right to the remedy, the same equitable
calculus underlying [Bonner Mall] is not present. Nor, given this Court's
involvement and initiative in the proceedings, does vacatur in this case
implicate the concerns expressed by the [Bonner Mall] Court about giving
parties undue control over judicial precedents. We see no appreciable harn
to the orderly functioning of the federal judicial system by vacating
judgment. 178
Under similar reasoning, in Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v.
Pacific Trading Cards, Inc., 179 the Second Circuit found satisfaction of the
"exceptional circumstances" standard. After losing a preliminary injunction
motion, plaintiff-appellant Major League sought an injunction pending
appeal from the Second Circuit.180 During oral argument, the panel
suggested that the parties attempt to negotiate a settlement and assigned
court staff counsel to mediate their discussions. 181 At the end of the day, a
settlement was reached that was contingent upon vacatur of the district court
decision. The parties informed the court that unless the district court's
preliminary injunction order was vacated, in future trademark cases
involving the Major League a defense of acquiescence could be asserted
against it.182 Because of the possibility of a collateral estoppel use of the
district court order, settlement was contingent upon such vacatur.
183
177 Motta, 61 F.3d at 118.
178 Id. Indeed, the court stated that it would be "inequitable" to place the public's
interest over the parties' best interests, which included settlement with a vacatur
provision. Constituting part of its analysis also were the statements that it was "absolutely
clear" that settlement would not occur absent vacatur and "a win for both sides" results
with a settlement. Under all these circumstances, including the court's role, "exceptional
circumstances" exist. Id. at 118-19.
179 Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Pac. Trading Cards, Inc., 150 F.3d 149,
149 (2d Cir. 1998).
180 See supra note 124.
181 Id. at 151.
182 See id.
183 Id.
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Citing Motta, the Second Circuit found that "exceptional circumstances"
existed and vacated the district court opinion. 184 The court explicitly
mentioned its involvement in directing the parties into mediation when
explaining its finding of exceptional circumstances. 18
5
In sum, both courts considered, rather than ignored, their role in assisting
the parties reach a settlement through court programs and orders when
evaluating the vacatur request.
B. Factoring Approach Achieves Several Important Goals
To ease the judicially strained application of the Bonner Mall standard
to consensual vacatur requests that result from participation in appellate
mediation programs, 186 a more elastic standard is necessary and appropriate.
Courts need to acknowledge their role in placing parties into settlement
processes. Following the guidance provided by the Motta and Major League
decisions, 187 I propose that courts should factor their role in moving the
parties off the appellate path and into court mediation sessions as one of the
several variables to consider when assessing a settlement-related vacatur
request. By so doing, the analysis would not begin and end by courts stating
that a party voluntarily settled a case on appeal. A greater effort would be
made to integrate the realities of appellate mediation programs in vacatur
case law. Such an approach would integrate the public interest in an orderly
judicial system and the development of appellate mediation programs. It also
would correct the strained judicial application of Bonner Mall to vacatur
requests arising out of participation in appellate mediation programs.
1. Integrates Public Interest in Orderly Judicial System and
Fosters Development of Appellate Mediation Programs
To justify the denial of settlement-related vacatur requests, courts often
rely upon the purportedly inefficient use of judicial resources inherent in
granting such requests. It has been posited that a more lenient standard
would encourage parties to waste judicial resources in their "gamble" to see
the outcome at the trial level before committing to settlement exploration. 188
184 See supra note 127.
185 Id. at 151.
186 See supra Part IV.A.
187 See supra Part V.A.
188 See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 28
(1994) ("Some litigants, at least, may think it worthwhile to roll the dice rather than settle
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Yet, what about the judicial resources committed to appellate mediation
programs? These programs are financed by the courts. 189 Is it not sound
jurisprudence to take parties' participation in an appellate mediation
program and the corresponding use of judicial resources dedicated to that
program into account when a vacatur request arises out of a successful
appellate mediation?
The public has an undeniable interest in judicial economy. Courts must
begin to develop a consistent position between the development of court
mediation programs and vacatur analysis to serve this public interest. The
narrow confines of the Bonner Mall "exceptional circumstances" standard
needs to be adjusted to reflect the realities of these programs designed to
conserve limited judicial resources. A judicial system that commits
significant resources to the operation of appellate mediation intended to
foster settlement, yet ignores the role that these programs have in assisting
parties reach settlement when evaluating a vacatur request, is not an orderly
one. Rather, it is a system where its separate, however, interlocking parts are
at cross-purposes. Such a disjunction results in the inefficient use of private
and public resources and undermines public confidence in the administration
of the judicial system. A factoring approach would correct this anomaly.
A factoring approach also would foster the continued growth of
appellate mediation programs in an effective manner. Participation to the
fullest extent would be feasible because the parties would be able to
completely explore all options and possibilities, including vacatur. Mediators
would be able to more fully explore all settlement possibilities.
2. Corrects Strained Judicial Application of Bonner Mall
Rigid application of the Bonner Mall standard to the more typical
consensual vacatur request arising from appellate mediation programs results
in strained judicial reasoning. A factoring approach corrects this strain and
provides a means to soundly address both of the touchstones of Bonner
Mall-party conduct and public confidence in the orderly operation of the
judicial system.
Under a framework provided in the Motta and Major League cases,
courts can analyze a vacatur request under the Bonner Mall standard and
in the district court ... if, but only if, an unfavorable outcome can be washed away by a
settlement-related vacatur.") See also Evans v. Mullins, 130 F. Supp. 774, 776 (W.D. Va.
2001) ("Judicial economy is not achieved where, as here, the time and resources
attendant to bringing a trial to fruition have already been spent, only to be undone
because the parties have settled at the end of the day.").
189 See supra Part II.B.2.
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include in that analysis the court's involvement in directing the parties
toward settlement. Under such an approach, if settlement occurs in an
appellate mediation program, a court will not automatically deny a vacatur
request by finding that an appellant unilaterally abandoned its appeal.
Rather, further analysis will be conducted to determine if vacatur is
appropriate by taking into account the totality of the circumstances.
A factoring approach can be used at the district court level as well. In
many instances, the district court is faced with the issue of whether to vacate
its decision to facilitate a settlement on appeal in the form of a Rule 60(b)
motion.' 90 The vast majority of published decisions reveal that the district
courts are following the reasoning of Bonner Mall instead of a broader
discretionary standard under Rule 60(b). 191 A factoring approach would ease
the strained judicial reasoning that occurs when district courts grant a
vacatur request within the rigorous Bonner Mall standard. To the extent the
district court applies a more discretionary standard under Rule 60(b), a
factoring approach would simply add another consideration to the analysis.
C. Potential Negative Consequences Do Not Outweigh Benefits
Under a factoring approach, courts-whether at the circuit or district
level-would continue to weigh the public interest concerns at stake against
the parties' reasons for requesting vacatur when deciding a post-judgment
vacatur request to assist settlement.' 92 Based upon such a weighing, a court
would decide whether vacatur is appropriate. However, under a factoring
approach, appellate mediation programs would not be ignored. Arguably, a
factoring approach could result in some negative developments and
consequences, including the possibility of parties using appellate mediation
strategically to hedge their risks and increasing confidentiality complications
for the programs if the mediator becomes involved in vacatur motion
practice. However, I contend that such potential negative effects could be
adequately addressed.
1. Addressing Improper Strategic Use of Mediation
If participation in an appellate mediation program may weigh favorably
in a settlement-related vacatur request, will parties be more likely to gamble
and settle only after the lower court ruling or judgment is issued and its
190 See supra Part III.D.
191 See supra Part III.D.
192 See supra Parts III.B.-III.D.
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impact is assessed? Arguably, the repeat litigants, often the powerful
corporate members of society, may employ such tactics. 193 Indeed, courts
have viewed vacatur requests by such repeat litigants as "dangerous."'
194
Unfortunately, lack of empirical evidence in this area requires reliance
upon logic and experience. It is reasonable to assume that the availability of
vacatur itself may delay settlement in some instances until after issuance of a
ruling.195 It is also reasonable to assume that if parties know that by
participating in an appellate court mediation program, a court may not as
readily deny their vacatur request, they may build such participation into
their case strategy. However, even assuming this strategic tack, the resulting
abuse of such an inefficient (and improper) use of court resources by the
parties can be checked on a case-by-case basis. The possibility under these
controlled circumstances, I submit, should not justify the current trend of
completely ignoring participation in all instances for all parties.
2. Confidentiality Concerns
Confidentiality is a critical component of appellate mediation
programs. 196 Program rules usually prohibit mediators, attorneys, and parties
from disclosing the substance of mediation sessions to any judge or
nonparty. Generally not considered confidential are items such as the fact
that the mediation took place, the bare results of the mediation (e.g., settled,
not settled), and any resulting post-mediation filing entered on the docket.197
If participation in appellate mediation programs becomes one of the
factors that courts will consider in deciding a settlement-related vacatur
request, there is the possibility that parties may seek to waive certain
confidentiality protections to enable the mediator to assist in their vacatur
application. For example, they may seek the mediator's assistance in
deciding whether to bring the request before the district court by asking the
193 A "repeat player"
can consider "long term" implications of judicial decisions in a way that almost all
Plaintiffs, who do not usually reappear in this Court, do not.... Thus, if permitted
by the Court... the [repeat player] might be tempted to use the technique of
settlement conditioned on vacatur to eradicate unfavorable decisions.
Reidell v. U.S., 47 Fed. Cl. 209, 213 (Fed. Cl. 2000).
194 Id. at 212.
195 In re Hiller, 179 B.R. 253, 261 (D. Colo. 1994) ("[T]his Court finds that vacatur
does not necessarily encourage settlements early in litigation and, in fact, may encourage
litigants to delay serious settlement discussions until after trial and pending an appeal.").
196 See supra Part II.B.1.
197Niemic, supra note 15, at 13-14; see supra note 45.
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mediator to make certain preliminary inquiries to the court. However, such a
possibility raises many serious implications about confidentiality and the
role of the mediator. 198 If a mediator becomes involved in vacatur motion
practice, the mediator's neutrality may be compromised in a specific case
and as a matter of general perception. Such an occurrence could have a
serious impact on the quality of appellate mediation programs.
Moreover, any informal communications between the mediator and
either the circuit or district court concerning a vacatur motion, even at the
parties' request, may place the mediator in a tense situation involving the
limited scope of what he is authorized to reveal and the potential breadth of
the court's inquiries. The confidentiality protections may become blurred.
If a factoring approach is adopted, careful consideration need be given to
how to address these confidentiality concerns. For example, court mediation
rules could be amended to make specific provisions. To eliminate any
encroachment on confidentiality in mediation, the safest course would be to
preclude any involvement by mediators in the parties' vacatur requests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Appellate mediation programs have become an integral part of circuit
courts' case management systems. If judicial integrity and public confidence
in the orderly operation of the judicial system are not to be diminished,
vacatur analysis for post-judgment settlements will have to change. In
vacatur case law, courts need to be made accountable for their active role in
detouring parties from the traditional appellate path when parties participate
in court-financed or court-mandated appellate mediation programs.
Incorporation of the courts' role into vacatur analysis would foster several
important goals. First, it would increase the integrity of the courts through
acknowledging their active role in directing parties to the "path" of
settlement. Second, vacatur case law and appellate mediation programs
would be evolving in tandem, not in opposition. Third, the public interest in
the orderly operation of the judicial system would be strengthened rather
than diminished. The factoring of appellate mediation programs into vacatur
case law would foster the best roles and aspirations of all concerned-the
court as resolver of active controversies, the parties as full participants in the
resolution of their disputes, and the public as benefactors of an orderly
judicial system.
198 See generally UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2001); UNIF. MEDIATION ACT reporters'
notes (2001).
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APPENDIX
Set forth below is a brief summary of the pre-argument conferencing,
mediation, or settlement programs of each of the regional courts of appeals
and the Federal Circuit. The summary highlights case eligibility, selection
process, and participation requirements (mandatory or voluntary).
Information provided below is from three sources: Mediation and
Conference Programs in the Federal Courts of Appeals;19 9 Case
Management Procedures in the Federal Courts of Appeals;200 and responses
by circuit court programs to a letter dated October 19, 2001, requesting a
review of the information below.
2 01
I. FIRST CIRCUIT: CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(CAMP)-IMPLEMENTED 1992
Eliible Case Types. All civil cases, except pro se cases, original
proceedings (such as petitions for writs of mandamus), INS cases, NLRB
summary enforcement actions, and cases with unresolved jurisdictional
problems. No prisoner cases (including habeas corpus petitions).
Selection Process. "[C]lerk's office refers all eligible cases to the Office
of Settlement Counsel, where they are scheduled for a conference."
202
Moreover, "at any time during a case, a circuit judge may refer any matter to
the program upon motion or sua sponte; ' 203 before or after oral argument.
Participation. Mandatory. Attorneys with full settlement authority.
Clients not required, but permitted to attend.
I. SECOND CIRCUIT: CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAN
(CAMP)--MPLEMENTED 1974
Eligible Case Types. All civil cases, except pro se cases and original
proceedings. No habeas corpus petitions or 28 U.S.C. § 2255 cases.
199 NIEMIC, supra note 1.
200 MCKENNA ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-32 tbl.17
201 Letters from Kathleen M. Scanlon, Esq., Senior Vice President and Director of
CPR Public Policy Projects, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution to circuit court
mediation programs (Oct. 19, 2001) (on file with the Ohio State Journal on Dispute
Resolution). Responses to the letters are on file with the author.
202 NIEMIC, supra note 1, at 19.
203 Id.
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Selection Process. Nearly all CAMP-eligible cases are scheduled for a
conferencing. Moreover, hearing panels may occasionally refer cases to the
program after argument but before decision.
Participation. Mandatory. Attorneys with appropriate settlement
authority, usually without clients; clients permitted but not required to
attend.
III. THIRD CIRCUIT: APPELLATE MEDIATION
PROGRAM-IMPLEMENTED 1995
Eligible Case Types. All civil cases, except pro se cases and original
proceedings.
Selection Process. "The clerk's officeforwards eligible cases to the
program director [who] reviews the case file and decides whether the case
should be placed in mediation" based on the issues presented and whether
those issues can be mediated and settled.204 If uncertain, the director may
talk to counsel. Some cases also enter at the request of one or more parties.
Moreover, hearing panels may refer cases to the program just before or after
oral argument.
Participation. Mandatory. Lead counsel with settlement authority; clients
required to attend.
IV. FOURTH CIRCUIT: OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT MEDIATOR FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT-IMPLEMENTED 1994
Eligible Case Types. All civil cases including agency cases with the
exception of pro se cases, prisoner cases and habeas corpus petitions.
Original proceedings such as mandamus petitions are not mediated unless an
appellate panel requests mediation.
Selection Process. Each of the mediators on staff receive their cases
from the clerk's office on a rotating basis. The individual mediator to whom
the cases are assigned makes a determination of case eligibility for
mediation. The emphasis is on acceptance of the case. In selecting cases, the
mediator gives weight to indications of receptiveness to settlement
(including whether a party requested mediation), complexity of case, amount
of monetary relief requested, and the nature of the issues (for example,
constitutional issues might not be appropriate for mediation). Occasionally,
the mediator may talk to counsel of record about prospects for settlement
204 Id. at 33.
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before selecting a case. Moreover, hearing panels may refer cases to the
program before or after oral argument.
Participation. Mandatory. Lead counsel with settlement authority; clients
permitted but not required to attend.
V. FIFTH CIRCUIT: APPELLATE CONFERENCE
PROGRAM-IMPLEMENTED 1996
Eligible Case Types. All civil cases, except pro se cases. No prisoner
cases.
Selection Process. Conference attorney reviews cases that are eligible
for the program and "schedules a conference in cases that appear to have
settlement potential, or where the conference might be helpful in narrowing
the issues,"20 5 including procedural issues. The conference attorney
schedules a conference in as many eligible cases as resources allow. A party
may request inclusion in the program at any time. Moreover, hearing panels
may refer cases to the program.
Participation. Mandatory, however, in cases assigned to program parties
may decline to participate, or participate further by submitting a letter. Lead
counsel required to participate in any scheduled conference; conference
attorney may require attendance by parties.
VI. SIXTH CIRCUIT: CIRCUIT MEDIATION CONFERENCE PROGRAM-
PERMANENTLY IMPLEMENTED IN 1983 (TRIAL BASIS IN 1981)
Eligible Case Types. All civil cases, except in practice pro se cases,
prisoner petitions, tax appeals, agency cases, and cases with unresolved
jurisdictional problems.
Selection Process. The chief circuit mediator reviews the pre-argument
statement and jurisdictional screening form. The Office of the Circuit
Mediator schedules a mediation conference in as many eligible cases as the
resources of the office will allow. A party may request inclusion in the
program at any time. Moreover, hearing panels may refer cases to the
program just before or after oral argument.
Participation. Mandatory. Lead counsel with authority to negotiate.
Generally, clients not required to attend.
205 Id. at 46.
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VII. SEVENTH CIRCUIT: SETILEMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM-
IMPLEMENTED 1994
Eligible Case Types. All civil cases, except pro se cases, prisoner
proceedings, Social Security disability, immigration, and original
proceedings. Commercial, employment cases, civil rights, environmental,
personal injury, ERISA, bankruptcy, intellectual property, tax, labor, and
agency are among the common types scheduled for conferences.
Selection Process. Senior conference attorney screens each eligible case.
Conferences are scheduled in as many eligible cases as resources allow.
Conferences also can be scheduled at the request of one or more parties.
Cases are not ordinarily referred by judicial panels.
Participation. Mandatory. Lead counsel with settlement authority.
Parties may also be required to attend and must in any event be available for
consultation by telephone.
VEI. EIGHTH CIRCUIT: SETTLEMENT PROGRAM-IMPLEMENTED 1981
Eligible Case Types. All civil cases, except pro se cases, cases dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction, cases with unresolved appellate jurisdictional
problems, Social Security Administration and agency disability cases,
federal income tax cases, original proceedings, interlocutory appeals, and
appeals of injunctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). No prisoner cases.
Selection Process. The director selects eligible cases that appear
appropriate for settlement discussions after reviewing documents provided
by the clerk's office. Special importance is placed on reviewing any trial
court opinions and expressions of interest in settlement on the appeal
information form or in appropriate telephone contact. In certain cases,
telephone conferences are routinely scheduled without prior contact, subject
to the party's option to cancel. Hearing panels rarely refer cases to the
Program.
Participation. Voluntary. Client participation is usually required for
either personal or telephone conferences.
IX. NINTH CIRCUIT: SETTLEMENT PROGRAM (CIRCUIT
MEDIATION PROGRAM)-IMPLEMENTED 1984
Eligible Case Types. All civil cases, except pro se cases, original
proceedings, and a few other select categories. No prisoner cases.
Selection Process. Circuit mediators review Civil Appeals Docketing
Statement to help them determine which eligible cases are appropriate.
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Following this review and in some cases after telephone calls to counsel of
record, the mediators select cases to be conferenced. One of the factors
considered is the parties' interest in participating in settlement negotiations.
The vast majority of cases are selected prior to briefing. If a case is not
selected, counsel may request mediation by submitting a confidential request
to the circuit mediator, before or after briefing. A hearing panel may refer a
case to the program, which usually occurs after briefing and argument.
Participation. Mandatory. Attorneys, sometimes with clients at
mediator's direction.
X. TENTH CIRCUIT: CIRCUIT MEDIATION
OFFICE-IMPLEMENTED 1991
Eligible Case Types. All civil cases, except pro se cases and cases with
unresolved jurisdictional problems. No habeas corpus proceedings. "Among
the many types of cases in the mediation program are bankruptcy appeals,
tax appeals, and agency cases such as petitions for review of NLRB
decisions" (many other programs contrary).
206
Selection Process. The Circuit Mediation Office randomly selects cases
from the pool of all newly docketed eligible cases. Parties may request a
conference. Moreover, hearing panels may refer cases to mediation just
before or after oral argument.
Participation. Mandatory. Lead counsel with settlement authority; circuit
mediator may permit or require client to attend.
XI. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: CIRCUIT MEDIATION
OFFICE-IMPLEMENTED 1992
Eligible Case Types. All civil cases are eligible for mediation, except
pro se cases and cases with unresolved jurisdictional issues. No prisoner
cases.
Selection Process. The clerk's office sends all eligible cases to the
Circuit Mediation Office, which reviews the cases and selects a cross-section
for mediation. Attorneys are encouraged to request a conference if they
believe a conference would be useful. Cases may also be referred to
mediation by an active or senior judge of the court of appeals.
Participation. Mandatory. Lead counsel with appropriate settlement
authority. Circuit mediators permit and may require parties to attend.
2 06 Id. at 82.
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XII. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT: APPELLATE MEDIATION
PROGRAM-IMPLEMENTED 1987
Eligible Case Types. The program handles a broad range of civil cases.
Pro se cases generally are not considered appropriate. No criminal cases.
Selection Process. "Attorneys in the clerk's office screen most civil and
agency cases to determine whether they are appropriate for mediation. The
clerk's office refers cases it believes might be appropriate to the director of
dispute resolution" within the circuit executive's office for another level of
review.20 7 The factors considered by the clerk's office and the director in
determining whether a particular case is appropriate for mediation include
nature of underlying dispute, relation of the issues on appeal to underlying
dispute, availability of incentives to reach settlement or limit the issues on
appeal, susceptibility of the issues to mediation, possibility of effectuating a
settlement, number of parties, and number of related pending cases.
Although counsel's views may be solicited, they are not dispositive. Parties
are encouraged to request mediation by submitting a request form to the
clerk. The Court treats such requests as confidential.
Participation. Mandatory. Attorneys with settlement authority. Clients
strongly encouraged, but not required, to attend.
XII. FEDERAL CIRCUIT: SETTLEMENT DISCUSSION RULE
No pre-argument mediation or conference program. Instead, Federal
Circuit Local Rule 33 requires counsel to engage in settlement discussions
and file a joint statement of compliance. No involvement of a third-party
neutral is required.
207 Id. at 95.
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